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ANALYSIS OF THE SURFACE WARFARE ENTERPRISE’S 






The Navy’s future success relies on its ability to improve its current level of readiness in 
an environment of limited budgets.  The enterprise concept has been the Navy’s tool to 
meet this fiscal challenge. Through better resource allocation, Navy Enterprise seeks to 
maximize return on investment (ROI).  Previous projects have analyzed the results from 
Sea Enterprise through 2005 and Naval Aviation Enterprise through 2007.  Addressing 
enterprise management in the surface warfare community expands this body of 
knowledge.   
This project focuses on enterprise practices in the surface navy.  It analyzes how 
the Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) is organized, governed, led and attempted to 
determine if changes in resource allocation can be attributed to these practices.  
 The results of this project reveal that SWE’s application of enterprise management 
practices through organization, governance, and leadership is largely consistent with 
corporate enterprise models and recommendations, but also identifies some areas of 
inconsistency and potential challenges unique to SWE that must be managed carefully.  
The project identifies some changes in resource allocation that can be attributed to SWE, 
but is largely inconclusive.  Further research into this area is recommended and a course 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Need for Navy Business Transformation 
You can’t be successful in leading this institution unless you become an expert in leading 
change. 
      ADM Vern Clark, CNO 
      8 September 2003 
 
There is much change about…I see opportunity there and we will seize those 
opportunities. 
      ADM Gary Roughhead, CNO 
      11 October 2007 
 In October 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
formally introduced Sea Power 21 as the Navy’s vision to confront the numerous 
challenges that would be faced in the 21st century. The goal of Sea Power 21 was to 
convert the present-day fleet from Cold War legacy technology into a modern, 21st 
century organization capable of executing missions that deter and defeat the country’s 
enemies around the world, rapidly and cost effectively.1  The initiative that was 
developed to address the business culture aspect of Sea Power 21 was Sea Enterprise.  
Through Sea Enterprise, Admiral Clark’s focus was to align business efforts, accelerate 
progress, and realize the potential of people.2   
 The need for Navy business alignment took root as Navy leadership realized the 
inevitable budget constraints and rising costs of advanced systems needed in the future.  
Within the Navy, quality management and business re-engineering practices had already 
taken shape in Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), but to economically replace 
and maintain the aging technology and systems of the Cold War era, the Navy needed to 
institute long term behavioral and cultural changes that transformed the way it did 
business as a whole.  Figure 1 illustrates the business culture the Navy needed to move 
                                                 
1 Gordon Meek, Center for Navy Business Excellence: A Catalyst for Navy Business Transformation 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 4. 
2 Ibid., 4. 
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away from, and what it desired to achieve.  The trend that can be seen is a focus on 
process improvement and on developing a culture more accepting of change.  In the past, 
Navy organizations have approached activities and decisions in a very stove-piped 
manner with minimal collaboration between groups, no end-product focus, and little 




Figure 1.   Institute Behavioral and Cultural Change.  (From:  Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces SWE Process Training Presentation, 2008) 
 With Sea Enterprise leading the Navy business transformation initiative, the 
Department of the Navy (DON) formed the Sea Enterprise Board of Directors (SEBOD) 
in March 2003 to execute existing business transformation initiatives and identify future 
savings opportunities to generate additional resources toward recapitalizing the fleet.4  In 
October 2004, this responsibility was turned over to the DON Business Council.5  In the 
late 21st century, the DON began implementing numerous business initiatives and 
processes that sought mainly to increase the efficiency of Navy-delivered services and 
products to the warfighters.6  
                                                 
3 Commander, Naval Surface Forces. Surface Warfare Enterprise Process Presentation (San Diego: 
2008). 




2. Process Improvement in the Navy 
 In the 1950s, Dr. Edward Deming and other quality specialists were brought in by 
Japanese industrialists to help produce better quality products.  Through their teachings, 
the Japanese took the total quality control (TQC) philosophy and became world quality 
leaders in the 1970s, with most success in the auto industry.7  Observing the success of 
Japanese quality, U.S companies began adopting quality initiatives.  
 Mainstream process improvements in the Navy began in the 1980s, when  
NAVAIR adopted Total Quality Management (TQM).  TQM was based heavily on the 
principles of TQC.  NAVAIR’s early TQM efforts led to substantial savings through 
acquisition streamlining, an increase in the number of mission-capable aircraft through 
the use of more reliable equipment, an improved spare parts inventory, and increased 
training for maintenance personnel.8  NAVAIR continued to introduce industry-proven 
continuous improvement business process methodologies (Lean, Theory of Constraints 
and Six Sigma) at the maintenance depot level in 1999, with the intent to deliver products 
to the fleet faster and at reduced costs.9   
 Lean manufacturing or production is a process management philosophy derived 
primarily from the Toyota Production System (TPS).  Lean focuses on the reduction of 
wastes in products or services.  Lean practices produced successful results in NAVAIR.  
Four hundred division power plants were able to reduce the engine turnaround time from 
eighty-three days in 2001 to fourteen days in 2002.  NAVAIR also reduced excess 
capacity from nine repair sites to three, reduced excess repair site manpower from over 
three-hundred to around one-hundred fifty personnel and reduced excess inventory by 
retiring forty aircraft engines.10   In the late 1990s, the lean manufacturing concept also 
became practice in major Navy shipyards.  Northrop Grumman Newport News (VA) 
shipyard began lean process improvements in supply chain management, engineering, 
                                                 
7 “TQM History,” http://www.quality-assurance-solutions.com/TQM-history.html. 
8 Raymond Malatino, The NAVAIR TQM Revolution:  Annual Quality Congress (1991): 40-45. 
9 Robert J. Williams, Evaluation of Naval aviation Enterprise Airspeed's Generation of Measurable 
Cost Savings and Reinvestment for Recapitalization of the Future Navy and Marine Corps (Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 2. 
10 Wally Massenburg, The Value of Enterprise Behavior (Lemoore, CA 2005). 
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manufacturing, programs/assembly and test, and other areas.11  In 2003, Northrop 
Grumman extended these lean practices to twelve of their suppliers resulting in 62 
percent reduction in overall defect rates, lead-times down an average 35 percent, and on-
time increased deliveries up to an average 91 percent from the previous 63 percent 
level.12 
 Originally developed by Motorola in the 1980s, Six Sigma is a process approach 
derived from statistics that seeks to identify and remove the causes of defects and errors 
in manufacturing and business processes. It combined TQM and other process 
improvement tools with a strong metrics approach to address defects.  Lean Six Sigma 
(LSS) is a synergistic meshing of Lean and Six Sigma as a program that yields a 
customer-focused, enterprise change strategy to deliver increased capability, improved 
results, and desired culture change.13  In 2004, LSS initiatives were introduced to Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and the DON partnered with the world’s leading 
authority on quality, the American Society for Quality (ASQ) to develop a customized 
Lean Six Sigma Black Belt certification. As of 2008, 4,420 leaders had completed the 
LSS training.14 
3. The Navy Enterprise 
a. Development 
The enterprise management concept was formally introduced to the Navy 
in Admiral Clark’s Sea Enterprise initiative.  Sea Enterprise sought to align all levels of 
the Navy’s business and standardize practices such as TQM and LSS.  NAVAIR led the 
enterprise initiative with the establishment of the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) in 
2004.  The goal of the NAE was to operate as an enterprise with the goal of producing 
aircraft ready for tasking at reduced cost and recapitalize savings to pay for the aircraft of 
                                                 
11 Lea A.P. Tonkin, “Northrop Grumman News: Reaching out to Suppliers” Target Magazine, 2006; 
51-56. 
12 Ibid., 53. 
13 CNSF, Enterprise Presentation, 14. 
14 Peter Peterka, 6 Six Sigma: Lean Six Sigma and the Navy, 2008. 
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the future.15  With the success of AIRSpeed and the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE), 
the Navy took hold of the enterprise concept and spread it through all warfare areas.  
Today, this Navy-wide business transformation initiative is known as Navy Enterprise.  
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of Navy Enterprise.  In the 1990s, Navy business 
improvements were mainly working from the bottom up, starting with NAVAIR.  In 
2001, top Navy leadership began to incorporate business transformation into DON 
strategy and business transformation initiatives like Sea Enterprise began to work from 








                                                 
15 Wally Massenburg, Enterprise Behavior. 
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b. Mission 
The purpose of Navy Enterprise as communicated by current senior 
leadership is: 
It’s about collaborating, sharing, and enhancing our business practices. 
Not to turn the Navy into a business, but to understand the business of the 
Navy so that we remain the most effective and efficient Navy in the world. 
      ADM Gary Roughhead, CNO 
      March 2008 
The environment that the Navy is operating in is complex and challenging and the range 
of operations is growing. In addition to the traditional Navy core capabilities of forward 
presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection, the new Maritime Strategy also 
calls for expanded capabilities such as maritime security, and disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance.16  The Navy’s cost continues to grow as well and is projected to 
increase significantly greater than the rate of inflation.  In order to cost-effectively 
execute the Maritime Strategy, the Navy needs the ability to re-capitalize and improve the 
Return on Investment (ROI). The Navy Enterprise initiative supports efforts within and 
across Navy headquarters and individual commands to improve ROI. 
c. Goal 
The ultimate goal or end state that Navy Enterprise is designed to achieve 
is a decentralized structure of all elements of the Navy organization.  This structure 
should continually work together towards a common purpose of delivering the Navy’s 
contribution to the defense of the United States in the right quantity, at the right time, and 
at the right cost.17 
 
                                                 




To understand the Navy Enterprise structure, it is important to distinguish 
the differences between the major enterprise components, the Fleet Readiness Enterprise 
(FRE) and the Provider Enterprise. Figure 3 illustrates the alignment and responsibilities 
of the Navy Enterprise organization. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Navy Enterprise Organizational Construct.  (From: Navy Enterprise 
Presentation, 2010) 
FRE is led by Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) and 
governs five individual warfare enterprises.  The FRE is responsible for managing the 
organization alignment and processes between the warfare enterprises and providers.  
FRE has a cohesive chain of command with the goal of ensuring forces ready for tasking 
at the lowest cost with its main focus on current fleet readiness.  The provider enterprise 
construct is not similar to the FRE.  It is composed of nine different providers and 
associated Program Executive Offices (PEOs).  They work separately and together to 
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deliver future capabilities and support current readiness to the warfare enterprises at the 
best available cost. The providers supply manpower, assets, parts, supplies, research and 
development, health care, and supporting infrastructure to the FRE and other providers.18  
Since there is no common output and providers often support different customers, its 
command structure is not as cohesive as the FRE.  Figure 4 better illustrates the Navy 
Enterprise business model and how each entity in the enterprise collaborates. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Navy Enterprise Business Model.  (From: Navy Enterprise Presentation, 
2010) 
The FRE and the five warfare enterprises are focused on maintaining 
current levels of fleet readiness in the constraints of a budget.  The challenge that 
providers face is supporting the current level of readiness but also looking into the future 
to determine what capabilities will be needed and at what capacity.   
  Another important distinction is the echelon framework. Echelon one 
represents the CNO, echelon two represents CFFC and Commander Pacific Fleet (CPF), 
and echelon three are the type commanders for each individual warfare enterprise.  Figure 
5 shows the Command and Control (C2) function of this echelon framework. 
                                                 
18 Navy Enterprise, Navy Enterprise. 
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Figure 5.   Navy Enterprise Framework.  (From: Navy Enterprise Presentation, 2010) 
e. Warfare Enterprises 
Navy Enterprise is structured around five individual warfare enterprises.  
Each warfare enterprise is supported by its providers and resource sponsors.  The FRE 
governs all five enterprises and ensures the warfare and provider enterprises collaborate.  
Each warfare enterprise is responsible to provide units ready for tasking in each of their 
assigned warfare area.  Every major warfare community in the Navy is represented by an 
enterprise. 
(1) Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise (NECE).  
Establishes processes and behavioral constructs to achieve greater efficiency and reduce 
costs and plans to develop metrics subsequently.  The enterprise is led by the 
Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.19 
(2) Undersea Warfare Enterprise (USE).  Focuses on 
increasing effectiveness and efficiency by improving the operational availability of the 
submarine fleet, improving commanding officer decision making, ensuring the presence 
of experienced submarine personnel throughout the defense community, and generating 
the capability required to maintain undersea superiority in the future.20 
                                                 
19 Jessie Riposo et al., Navy Enterprises, Evaluationg Their Role in Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE). (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2009), 8. 
20 Ibid., 8. 
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(3) NETWAR/FORCEnet Enterprise (NNFE).  Its mission is to 
provide and operate a global network to win battles in the Information Age.  NNFE is 
involved in the business of command, control, communications, computers, 
collaboration, and intelligence and information operations.21 
(4) Naval Air Enterprise (NAE).  Support the warfighter by 
providing combat-ready naval aviation forces.  The NAE measures efficiency and 
effectiveness by aviation units ready for tasking at reduced cost, which is accomplished 
by improved reliability, process efficiencies, reduced cycle time and other efforts.22 
(5) Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE).  Its mission is to 
provide combat-ready surface forces to the fleets and combatant commanders.23 
4. Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) 
The Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) was established in 2005, shortly after 
NAE.  SWE is headed by Commander Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) and exists to 
provide surface warships fully ready for tasking to fleet commanders in order to meet 
combatant commander war fighting requirements.24  To achieve this mission, SWE 
primarily focuses on providing the surface navy with trained sailors and ready warships 
through joint enterprise processes that balance risk and return on investment (ROI).   
In recent years, the surface navy has been facing a decline in readiness.  Cost-
cutting decisions that have been made throughout the last two decades have severely 
degraded ship readiness.25  This degradation has been a result of focus on efficiencies and 
interrelated decisions to reduce manning, alter the training process, and restructure 
maintenance.26  In 2008, SWE leadership was able to identify how these separate 
efficiency initiatives established in the early 2000s have combined to cause dramatic 
                                                 
21 Riposo et al., Navy Enterprises, 8. 
22 Ibid., 8. 
23 Riposo, PPBE, 8. 
24 CNSF, Enterprise Presentation. 
25 Admiral J C Harvey, Jr Commander, US Fleet Forces Command Congressional Testimony 111th 
Cong., 2nd sess., Cong. Rec. (28 July 2010). 
26 Phillip Ewing, “USNs Lean Manning Backlash,” Defense News (2010): 1. 
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reductions in surface combatant effectiveness.  A Fleet Review Panel commissioned by 
ADM John Harvey (CFFC) in early 2010 verified what SWE leadership had previously 
found. 
With fiscal challenges growing in upcoming years, SWE practices will be vital to 
correcting and improving surface fleet readiness.  For the fiscal 2012 budget request, 
Defense Secretary Gates has challenged each military branch to find billions of dollars in 
overhead savings with an incentive to re-invest the costs that are cut back into their 
budgets so force size does not diminish.27  As the Navy’s 2012 budget is scrutinized, 
SWE business practices must be efficient at all levels so re-allocated savings can improve 
the future readiness of the surface fleet.  A better knowledge foundation of the Navy 
Enterprise concept, by analyzing SWE leadership, governance, and resource allocation 
since its establishment in 2005 will provide information that can help the Navy’s business 
transformation agenda move forward. 
B. RESEARCH 
This research draws upon the efforts of SWE from 2005 through the present and 
analyzes how SWE is organized, governed, and led.  The research attempts to recognize 
the changes in resource allocation that can be directly attributed to SWE.   
1. Primary Research Question 
How was enterprise management implemented in Surface Warfare Enterprise; 
how is it organized, governed and led? 
2. Supporting Research Questions 
 To what extent have there been changes in resource allocation? 
 Can these changes in resource allocation be attributed to SWE? 
 
                                                 
27  Jean DiMascio, “Gates Gears up for Cuts Fight,” August 10, 2010, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38643.html. 
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C. BENEFIT OF PROJECT 
This project provides an analysis of Surface Warfare Enterprise and builds on a 
body of knowledge from earlier studies of Sea Enterprise and Naval Aviation Enterprise.  
It will provide an analysis of the relationship between the organization and governance of 
SWE and changes in resource allocation.   
 The purpose of this project is to present a broad analysis and better understanding 
of how the SWE effort is contributing to the Navy’s return on investment and business 
transformation agenda.  This analysis will build a better knowledge foundation of the 
Enterprise concept in the Navy and contribute to greater understanding of Navy efforts to 
align organizations and programs in a constrained fiscal environment. 
D. PROJECT SCOPE 
This project provides an external look at the Surface Warfare Enterprise and how 
it has implemented enterprise management practices through organization, governance, 
and leadership. The time frame covered will be FY-2005 through FY-2010 to allow a 
then and now comparison following the implementation of SWE in 2005.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
This project reviews the background and examines the implementation of 
enterprise management in SWE.  It attempts to identify how enterprise behavior and 
models were used in the development of SWE’s organization, governance, and 
leadership.  It also investigates what changes in resource allocation can be attributed to 
enterprise management.  Through the review and analysis of SWE history, strategic 
plans, organizational charts, training presentations, and interviews of key SWE personnel, 
this project formulates a more clear understanding of how SWE has implemented 
enterprise management behavior and practices.   
 A literature review of relevant topics related to enterprise management concepts 
was conducted.  This literature review focused on organizational alignment, cross-
functional management, organizational governance, and leadership.  A review of 
previous research on enterprise management in Sea Enterprise and Naval Aviation 
Enterprise was also conducted and used in the project. 
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 A series of interviews was conducted with senior level surface military leaders 
and civilian personnel.  Interviews were scheduled by e-mail through the N40 SWE 
support staff and conducted at Surface Forces Headquarters and onboard USS Sterret 
(DDG 104) in San Diego.  All personnel interviewed held elite and specialized positions 
within SWE.  Each interview was transcribed and methodically reviewed for trends that 
could explain how enterprise management has worked within SWE.  Based on a thorough 
literature review and data collection, an analysis was conducted to evaluate how 
enterprise management has been implemented in SWE, and how it is contributing (or not 
contributing) to resource allocation. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF PROJECT 
 This project is presented in the following order: 
 This chapter, Chapter I, establishes the historical background of how process 
improvement ideas and corporate business management concepts resulted in the 
development of the Navy Enterprise.  It also presents the organizational construct of the 
Navy Enterprise and the relationships between individual warfare enterprises.  Project 
purpose, scope, and methodology are also discussed. 
 Chapter II, Literature Review, provides framework of enterprise management 
concepts from which research findings can be discussed.  The study of organization, 
governance, and leadership enables the analysis of SWE and how enterprise concepts are 
being implemented. 
 Chapter III, Surface Warfare Enterprise, presents archival research and interview 
data that is the basis for analysis of the primary research question.  This chapter captures 
the history of SWE and discusses in detail how enterprise management was implemented 
through organization, governance, leadership.  Data is also presented in an attempt to 
answer the supporting questions, but is ultimately not sufficient enough to support an 
appropriate analysis.  An explanation for this is provided in the concluding chapter.  
 Chapter IV, Analysis of SWE Enterprise Management Implementation, provides 




presented in Chapter II.  It will specifically analyze SWE organization, governance, and 
leadership.  Data provided from this analysis becomes the basis for the projects 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, presents conclusions and 
recommendations based on whether or not SWE’s implementation of enterprise 
management conforms to the models and concepts discussed in Chapter II.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents background information from the literature related to 
concepts of enterprise management.  Its purpose is to build a framework to analyze and 
discuss the findings that are presented in the remainder of this project.  Organization 
through alignment is discussed through experiences of successful leading organizations.  
These authors discuss what is required for an organization to get and keep all vital 
elements aligned and headed in the same direction at the same time while remaining 
centered in a business reality of constant change.  They also discuss the necessary levels 
of management, and leadership functions required for an organization to maintain a long-
term future focus.  Next, this chapter addresses how human behavioral dynamics interacts 
with corporate governance practices and structure.  This section will also discuss 
organizational control as a paradox.  Control is important to understand because it is a 
large factor in how an organization is governed, and how decisions about the future 
direction of an organization are made. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP 
1. George Labovitz With Victor Rosansky:  The Power of Alignment:  
How Great Companies Stay Centered and Accomplish Extraordinary 
Things 
Labovitz and Rosansky have found through research and experience with clients 
in many different industries that growth and success in an organization are ultimately the 
result of alignment between four elements: people, customers, strategy, and processes.28  
To be successful during turbulent times, management must keep people focused and 
centered on a few key business objectives.  To accomplish this, organizations must create 
a self-aligning and self-sustaining culture that distributes leadership and energy 
throughout the organization and unleash an organizational power they call “alignment.”29 
                                                 
28 George Labovitz  and Victor Rosansky,  The Power of Alignment: How Great Companies Stay 
Centered and Accomplish Extraordinary Things (USA: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), preface.  
29 Ibid., preface. 
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a. The Main Thing 
According to Labovitz and Rosansky, every organization has a “Main 
Thing”—the single most powerful expression of what it hopes to accomplish. Its 
instrument for producing growth and profits must be a common and unifying concept to 
which every unit can contribute.30  Labovitz and Rosansky state, “The greatest challenge 
that managers face today is keeping their people and organization centered on this main 
thing in the midst of change.”31  This challenge has two different aspects: 
(1) Get everyone headed in the same direction with a shared 
purpose. 
(2) Integrate resources and systems of the organization to 
achieve that shared purpose which they consider the main 
thing.32 
Determining and aligning an organization to this main thing is difficult, 
and through interviews with many successful chief executive officers (CEO), Labovitz 
and Rosansky found that these CEOs followed the same deceptively simple steps: 
(1) Carefully crafting and articulating the essence of their 
business and determining the main thing. 
(2) Defining a few critical strategic goals and imperatives and 
deploying them throughout their organizations. 
(3) Tying performance measures and metrics to those goals. 
(4) Linking these measures to a system of rewards and 
recognition. 
(5)  Personally reviewing the performance of their people to 
ensure goals are met.33 
Constant connection to an organizations main thing is vital to its success.  
Many companies that attempted to implement improvement processes such as TQM, 
                                                 
30 Labovitz and Rosansky,  The Power of Alignment, 40. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Ibid., 13. 
33 Ibid., 13. 
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inadvertently fell into an activity trap with lots of teams working on lots of problems but 
with no connection to the main thing of the business.34  Business re-engineering also did 
not create linkages between different parts of the business and perhaps its greatest 
weakness was a disregard for people, both managers and workers alike.35  According to 
Labovitz and Rosansky, alignment links strategy and people and integrates them with 
customers and process improvement and ensures that everyone understands the main 
thing of the business.36  Achieving this is not easy but sustaining it once it has been 
achieved is even more difficult. 
b. Staying Centered 
Labovitz and Rosansky state that aligning a department or business is 
similar to landing an airplane; it is an ongoing balancing act that involves setting 
direction, linking processes and systems, and making constant adjustments.  If you fail to 
adjust, you will drift, over adjust and lurch from one side of your intended course to 
another.37  The ability to stay centered around the main thing relies on two essential 
dimensions being in sync, vertical and horizontal.   
(1) Vertical Alignment:  The vertical dimension is concerned 
with organizational strategy and the people that are relied on daily to transform strategy 
into meaningful work.38  When this is reached, all employees understand organization-
wide goals and their role in achieving them.  When executive level leaders and managers 
develop strategies in isolation from the people who execute them, it is inevitable that the 
strategies will not be successfully incorporated into the environment of the low level 
employees. This is the reason why continual feedback must be established between the 
two.   
 
 
                                                 
34 Labovitz and Rosansky,  The Power of Alignment, 25. 
35 Ibid., 26. 
36 Ibid., 26. 
37 Ibid., 170. 
38 Ibid., 170. 
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(2) Horizontal Alignment:  The horizontal dimension involves 
the business processes that create what the customer values most.39  It eliminates the 
boundaries between the organization and the customer and incorporates the customer into 
the decision making process. 
Labovitz and Rosansky demonstrate through figure 6 the dynamic 
relationship that exists between the four elements when alignment is achieved in both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
 
Figure 6.   Link to Elements.  (From: Labovitz and Rosansky. 44, 1997) 
c. Distributed Leadership 
Distributed leadership, according to Labovitz and Rosansky, is the glue of 
alignment.  They define it as the presence of capable leadership in different units and at 
different levels of an organization.40  The military has always set the example for 
corporate business when it comes to distributed leadership in action.  However, there are 
still two different environments in which military leaders operate.  To illustrate this, 
Labovitz and Rosansky use military leadership characteristics during peace-time and 
combat. 
                                                 
39 Labovitz and Rosansky,  The Power of Alignment, 170. 
40 Labovitz and Rosansky,  The Power of Alignment,44. 
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(1) Peace Time Characteristics 
 No compelling mission or threat to galvanize efforts or stir 
emotions. 
 Objective is preparedness and self-maintenance. 
 Units engage in periodic training and busy work. 
 Things are done by the book with a tremendous emphasis on 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
 Little is left to the imagination or discretion of an individual 
soldier. 
 Prevailing attitudes include boredom, grousing and looking out for 
you. 
(2) Combat Characteristics 
 Military formality becomes the first casualty. 
 Hierarchy exists on paper but is replaced by organic behavior. 
 Mission is clear. 
 People forget differences and bond around a common goal. 
 People who bored are now engaged and emotionally charged. 
 Leaders are in situations which they must do their own thinking 
and acting. 
According to Labovitz and Rosansky, an aligned company operates in a 
combat like environment where competition is intense, change is rapid, hierarchies exist 
but do not act like they are governed by them and are able to respond rapidly and in 
organic ways.  Misaligned companies act like peace-time armies where clear objectives 
are lacking, employees don’t see the purpose of their work and strong leadership only 
exists at the top.   
In order to ensure an organization acts with the commitment and level of 
effort consistent with a combat unit, Labovitz and Rosansky offer practices that 
leadership must be able to accomplish.  First, people must stay continually connected to 
the hostile environment in which they operate, and leadership must ensure everyone 
understands what is at stake.  Second, help people think holistically.  Leadership cannot 
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expect people to make the right decisions and do things beneficial to the organization if 
they cannot see the big picture.  Third, the focus should always be on the main thing, and 
not on department specific goals.  Fourth, reward and recognize people for working 
towards the main thing and not only for department specific goals.  Fifth, use the review 
process to carry the message to employees, which will drive future behavior.  Last, create 
opportunities for people to interact.  A more effective working environment is established 
when people personally know and empathize with the other individuals of the 
organization.41 
2. Terence T. Burton With John W. Moran:  The Future Focused 
Organization: Complete Organizational Alignment for Breakthrough 
Results 
Burton and Moran refer to a model which they call the future-focused 
organization.  The focus of this model is on helping organizations and its leadership 
develop a future-focused strategic business development and deployment process.42  Two 
key aspects for an organization to meet its long-term objectives are levels of management 
and leadership.  
a. Levels of Management 
A future-focused organizational structure is very lean and is composed of 
three types of management: Strategic, Lateral, and Daily. 
   (1) Strategic Management. Strategic Management is a 
permanent structure in an organization that is focused on the development and 
deployment of strategic goals to all levels of the daily management work units.43  
According to Burton and Moran, the following are certain functions that strategic 
management must be able to accomplish: 
 Focus on keeping the organization on the right course. 
 Plan major shifts in emphasis, needs, and expectations. 
                                                 
41 Labovitz and Rosansky,  The Power of Alignment,44. 
42 Terence Burton and John Moran, The Future Focused Organization: Complete Organizational 
Alignment for Breakthrough Results (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), preface. 
43 Ibid., 31. 
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 Work on common areas that are causing obstacles in accomplishment of 
the strategic goals. 
 Align routine functional daily work with strategic effectiveness and 
efficiency goals. 
 Develop the appropriate structure to meet the desired goals. 
   The strategic management level must be the external and future 
focus of the organization.44  Even though strategic managers should not be involved in 
day-to-day issues, they do need to ensure that the daily management of the organization 
is properly aligned to the current and future needs of the organization.45  If these are not 
aligned and structured correctly, it will create stress in the organization and cause a 
reduction in value-added work.   
(2) Lateral Management (Cross Functional). Lateral 
Management is more of a temporary, alliance-based structure in the organization that 
concentrates on organization-wide flexibility goals and objectives.46  This level of 
management is where solutions are developed that break down the boundaries of an 
organization.  Lateral management focuses on the system and culture of the organization 
with its primary purpose being achievement of more fluid processes.  It does this by 
defining the common areas between daily functional managers and by improving the 
flexibility of the organization.47  Burton and Moran consider the following characteristics 
important for lateral management success:48 
 Management involvement based on inter divisional cooperation. 
 A horizontal integration process to help an organization achieve efficient 
organization flexibility goals. 
 Organizational barrier breaking approach that reduces complex layering. 
 A process to deploy top level management functions. 
                                                 
44 Burton and Moran, Future Focused, 33. 
45 Ibid., 32. 
46 Ibid., 33. 
47 Ibid., 32. 
48 Ibid., 35. 
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 A cultural change agent. 
 A process to define the common ground between functional units to 
facilitate the flow of horizontal work. 
(3) Daily Management. Daily management, like strategic, is a 
permanent but routine structure in an organization that focuses on the routine daily work 
that accomplish functions that convert inputs into outputs.  Daily managers focus their 
respective work units on continuous improvement of their routine processes.49  This level 
comprises a majority of the employees.  It is internally focused but should be ready to 
adapt as the organization strategic management changes direction or emphasis.  Figure 7 
shows the structure of all three types of management. 
 
Figure 7.   Management Structure. (From: Burton and Moran, 34, 1995) 
b. Leadership 
  Military leadership principles are much different when compared to 
corporate leaders.  However, responsibility of leadership positions in an organization can 
be compared across different cultural lines.  Burton and Moran define leadership in any 
organization as those responsible for the entire system.50  Leadership does not necessarily 
mean one person in the organization.  It applies to the group within an organization that 
sets the long-term course of the organization and enables and assists the rest of the 
                                                 
49 Burton and Moran, Future Focused, 34. 
50 Ibid., 62. 
 23
organization in accomplishing it.51  Burton and Moran argue that for an organization to 
have the capacity to achieve its long-term objectives, leadership must take on and execute 
certain responsibilities.  These required functions are listed below: 
 Develop and distribute the strategic plan. 
 Explain, council, and coach lower level managers and units on how to 
accomplish the planned direction. 
 Develop enthusiasm and trust in lower levels by empowering people, and 
delivering resources for them to accomplish the strategic direction they 
established. 
 Ensure people understand what is expected, that their actions support it, 
and that everyone is held accountable for their actions, no matter what 
level.52  
  In the past, organizations could focus on long-term change since the 
environment was more predictable.53  For businesses the customer was obvious.  For the 
government and military, the enemy was obvious.  Now organizations have to change 
rapidly because the environment is constantly changing.  This ability to adapt applies to 
all institutions including government.54  In order to manage resources more effectively in 
a more uncertain environment, the navy has applied enterprise management across all 
warfare areas.  Since this style of management is relatively new leadership has to be 
aware of certain behavioral functions.  According to Burton and Moran, successful 
transformation into a different style of strategic long-term management requires 
leadership willing to practice and perform four critical behavioral functions:  Chosen 
thought, conscious speech, consistent action, and constant care.  These functions are 
explained in more detail below:   
                                                 
51 Burton and Moran, Future Focused, 62. 
52 Burton and Moran, Future Focused, 30–70. 
53 Ibid., 30–70. 
54 Ibid., 30–70. 
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(1) Chosen Thought. focus on processes, data, and information 
sharing.  Leadership must not default to thinking of people as the problem, but first focus 
on other parameters of a problem situation. 
(2) Conscious Speech. sets the tone for cultural change that is 
necessary to achieve purpose.  Leadership must focus on improvements, encourage 
questions, discuss critical processes, and focus on breakthroughs. 
(3) Consistent Action. similar to Deming’s constancy of 
purpose.  Requires leadership to act the way they want others to act and respond. 
(4) Constant Care. leadership must ensure people that they are 
on the right course and provide resources, training, rewards, and recognition for 
appropriate behavior and accomplishments.55 
The organizations that will be prepared to best handle the uncertain future with 
limited resources are those with leadership that can execute the responsibilities implied 
by their position, and embrace critical behavioral functions that will allow them to set a 
course, transform an organization, and lead all levels of the organization.  
3. Dan Dimancescu:  The Seamless Enterprise:  Making Cross Functional 
Management Work 
 Dan Dimancescu defines and argues the importance of cross-functional 
management, first illustrating the background and issues organizations faced with a heavy 
vertical hierarchy: the issue of workers being too specialized and not understanding the 
whole system; numerous layers of command and control; and control of workers through 
reward and punishment.  According to Dimancescu, this vertical management style led 
departments into their own specialized group, with a specialized language and no 
appreciation for the whole process.56 
                                                 
55 Burton and Moran, Future Focused, 30–70. 
56 Dan Dimancescu, The Seamless Enterprise: Making Cross Functional Management Work  (Essex 
Junction VT: Oliver Wright Publications, 1992), 4. 
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a. Definition of Cross Functions 
  Dimancescu uses the cross function definition used by the Japan Union of 
Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) in 1988.  They define cross function as:”a management 
process designed to encourage and support interdepartmental communication and 
cooperation throughout a company—as opposed to command and control through narrow 
departments or divisions.  The purpose is to attain such company-wide targets as quality, 
cost, and delivery of products and services by optimizing the sharing of work.”  
Dimancescu defines the role of cross-functional management as addressing problems 
associated with sequential hand-offs and chimney like structures by creating a new 
category of functions that threads across traditional departmental boundaries.57  The 
concept of cross function adds a dimension to TQM that links divisional and 
departmental activities through horizontal communication.58    
b. Cross Function Team Composition 
  According to Dimancescu, the temptation of traditionally-managed 
companies is to treat problems as a crisis.59  Instead the problem is usually a result of a 
deficiency in the process.  Cross-function teams should be composed of people who 
know and live with a process and have day-to-day responsibilities taken from across an 
organizations divisions, departments, suppliers, or customers.60 
C. GOVERNANCE 
1. Margot Cairnes.  Boardrooms That Work:  A Guide to Board Dynamics 
With the assistance of 100 Chief Financial Officers, (a group known as the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors) Margot Cairnes wrote an article examining 
how board dynamics and many issues related to governance as it relates to the success 
                                                 
57 Dimancescu, Seamless Enterprise, 12. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 18. 
60 Ibid., 19. 
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and failure of a governing body.  Many characteristic are discussed that describe the 
culture of the governing body of a corporation, it Board of Directors (BOD). 
A key point discussed in the Cairnes report is the four phases that are used to 
analyze processes within the board.  These processes represent a circular flow of 
information.  Figure 8 outlines how processes are put in place to allow corporate boards 
of directors to be analyzed.  
 
Figure 8.   Four processes of good governance. (From:  Cairnes, 2003.) 
a. Board Processes 
  The first process recognizes the requirement to implement good processes.  
However, even the best processes are driven by people, who are in turn driven by 
personal and group-based factors.  Processes only work well when people operate them 
well.61  This process describes the general desire of a BOD to want to succeed.  In order 
                                                 
61 Margot Cairnes, Boardrooms That Work: A Guide to Board Dynamics (Sydney: Australian Institute 
of Company Directors, 2003), 8. 
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for a board to successfully run an organization, the people in charge need to have the 
capability to implement new policies to keep the company evolving with its competition. 
b. Board Malfunctions 
  The second process notices the early warning signs that indicate these 
processes are malfunctioning and could cause problems later on.62  This process 
describes a need for the board members to realize when a change or a process is failing.  
Members have a responsibility to the people that work under them to effectively 
eliminate processes that are failing. 
c. Board Dynamics 
  The third process understands the human dynamics that create these 
malfunctions and how these dynamics can change for better decisions.63  This process 
explores the human element.  The Cairnes article discusses several signs attributed with 
board failure.  A selection of these signs are listed and described below: 
(1) The dominant personality.  The dominate personality 
intimidates other members of the board room.  This specific personality trait is 
detrimental to fostering an environment that welcomes the open flow of communication. 
An unruly personality can have a negative impact on the board. “The healthiest way to 
deal with political dynamics is to bring them to the surface, discuss them, observe them, 
and deal with them openly.”64 
(2) Hurried decisions based on inadequate data.  Perfect 
information is expensive and hard to locate.  Most decisions made by board members are 
based on inaccurate information.  In the business world policies need to be made quickly, 
as a rapid change could have drastic financial rewards.  A board that bases it decisions on 
inadequate data is taking a risk. 
(3) Serial restructuring and resignations of key individuals. 
                                                 
62  Cairnes, Boardrooms That Work, 7. 
63 Cairnes, Boardroom, 11. 
64 Ibid., 12. 
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Changing of key leadership positions within any organization can have a negative 
response in the board room.  Members within the organization are often left in the dark 
as why these people have left the company.  Often executives leave an organization to 
pursue other interests.  These interests can sometimes conflict with the strategic goals of 
the organization.  This change in leadership is cause for malfunction. 
(4) Do as I say, not as I do.  It is important for leaders within 
an organization to comply with the values and rules of the company.65 Leaders within the 
board that do not act in accordance with these characteristics do not represent the best 
people within an organization.  These leaders do not promote the best values of the 
organization. 
(5) The cover-up.  Public opinion is a large factor in any 
organization.  Companies lose credibility when they try cover-up errors made by either 
personnel in the company, or poor decisions made from within the BOD.  Ethical 
concerns are not always the primary factor in decisions made by a board, and sometimes 
the results have a negative impact. 
(6) Interfering with the information flow.  Interfering with the 
flow of information can have a negative impact on board performance primarily due with 
discussions and debates created in conjunction with the problem instead of problem 
solution.  The Cairnes article discusses several tactics that can be of concern to a BOD.  
The majority if these concerns addresses overflowing BOD members with an excessive 
amount of information, and not providing adequate time for a review prior to making a 
decision. 
(7) Favoring particular interests.  This area describes decisions 
made in manipulation and interpretation of federal laws and guidelines that represent the 
best interests of the company.  The article points out that the failure of many companies 
has been attributed to poor accounting practices and an overall lack of integrity. 
                                                 
65  Cairnes, Boardrooms That Work, 13. 
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d. Board Culture 
  The fourth process puts things right, ensuring that the environment is 
optimal for continuing good governance.  This may require modifying processes to 
incorporate lessons learned during the first three processes.66 Her article provides insight 
into human behavior and explores some of the reasons attributed to poor governance 
especially when used to analyze a BOD.  She discusses personal interests, greed, and 
lust for power as possible reasons that members of boards fail in their responsibilities to 
the organization.  It also discusses the steps to build a healthy culture within the BOD.   
 
 Including building a healthy, functioning culture as an ongoing board 
agenda item, even if some directors think that the board culture needs no 
improvement.  The more directors who think there is nothing to improve, 
the more likely it is that the board culture needs a review. 
 Assessing the current board culture and your progress over time, seeking 
outside assistance as necessary 
 Working out what kind of board culture you want67 
2. Phillip J. Streatfield:  The Paradox of Control in Organizations 
 Philip Streatfield uses his own experiences and practices as a manager to address 
the central question of organizations: who is in control?  Streatfield suggests that the idea 
of a manager being in control in an organization is a paradox.  The main argument is to 
falsify the traditional views of management: an objective observer who is outside the 
process, reduces unpredictability and misuse of resources by correcting deviations, and 
deliberately designs the process from which the organization operates.   
a. Mainstream Understanding of Control 
  The mainstream understanding requires the manager’s position to be in 
control of the organization and eliminate everything not in control.  According to 
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Streatfield, this understanding is more problematic than usually assumed because 
managers are both in control and not in control at the same time.68   As an organization 
moves into the future, the essential function of management is to control that movement 
by observing the system, analyzing it, designing it, and acting upon leverage points so 
that the movement into the future realizes or unfolds a state that has already been devised 
in the past or present.69  Along the way, deviations from the path are detected and 
corrected so movement stays on the path designed by managers.  The goal and the path 
are largely known and formed intently by management so the organizations movement is 
predictable, stable, regular and certain.70 
  The issue that Streatfield has with the mainstream understanding of 
control is how little attention it gives to the present.  It relies on patterns experienced in 
the past and the projection into the future, which means that the meaning of what people 
do is located in the past, or identified in the vision of the future.71  Streatfield proposes a 
perspective called the complex responsive process perspective which avoids collapsing 
thought to either in control or not in control and allows managers to embrace the paradox 
within which they must work. 
b. Complex Responsive Process 
  The present is not a point through which an organization passes on its way 
from the past toward the future.  Instead it is a living process of communication in which 
the meaning of the gesture past is changed in the future response.72  The perspective of 
complex responsive processes shows that it is stable and self-organizing patterns of 
meaning that maintain a sense of order and control as managers go about daily activities.  
An important aspect of this perspective is how key the role of conversation and 
communicative interaction between managers and members of the organization is in 
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developing the organizations future.  Streatfield suggests that the future of an 
organization is created through the communicative interaction of gestures and responses 
made by managers and other members of an organization in the present situation.73   
  According to Streatfield, since it is impossible for any participant in an 
organization to be fully in control, the essential function of managers cannot be to simply 
control the movement of the organization.  The movement of an organization is stable 
and unstable, regular and irregular, predictable and unpredictable all at the same time.74  
Transformative movement of an organization can only be accomplished with a diversity 
of human participation and conformity, consensus and conflict, understanding and mis-
understanding all occurring simultaneously.75  A purely hierarchical structure seeks to 
remove the negative variables not in control instead of embracing them as part of the 
process. 
  Another important aspect that organizations must face and is inherent in 
the reality of management is anxiety.  Streatfield defines anxiety as a general state of 
unease for which no causal object can be identified.  Anxiety relates to a sense of 
something being amiss with the unconscious sensing of the potential loss of meaning.76  
For management to lead an organization successfully, managers must have the capacity 
to continually participate with members of the organization in which new meaning and 
direction potentially emerges.  Through this understanding of control, management can 
effectively transform the identity of the organization and its participants and lead the 
organization into the future.77   
c. Management Participation in the Construction of Meaning 
  Streatfield argues that the key management ability is not one of being in 
control; instead it is the ability to participate creatively in the formation of transient 
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meaning.78  Establishment of this meaning will allow the participants to live with the 
anxiety that is natural in a changing environment.  Construction of meaning will also 
create a sense of order, coherence, pattern and control.79  The key distinction between 
mainstream thinking of management and what Streatfield proposes is the participative 
construction of the organization’s meaning.  Mainstream thinking focuses attention on 
management intention and system control mechanisms to reduce variables that cannot be 
controlled.  The focus of complex responsive processes focuses attention on the wider 
self-organizing dynamic in which managers participate and collaborate through all levels 
of the organization.80  
D. SUMMARY  
 This literature review has discussed ideas and concepts presented by their authors 
that will build a framework on which to discuss concepts related to enterprise 
management throughout the remaining chapters.  The first was Labovitz and Rosansky’s 
argument of the importance of organizational alignment.  For an organization to stay 
centered through change, it must be vertically and horizontally aligned.  They also focus 
on the organizations main thing which should be used to generate a culture of unity with 
capable leadership at all levels of the organization.  Burton and Moran build on this 
concept of alignment as they discussed their model for the future-focused organization.  
They argue the necessity of three levels of management for an organization to set and 
accomplish long-term objectives.  They place a heavy emphasis on the lateral or cross-
functional level of management which Dimancescu further elaborates on.  Burton and 
Moran also discussed responsibilities and behavioral functions required by an 
organizations leadership.  Cairnes presents the social dynamic that is present in 
organizational governance and how it must be managed for a governing body to employ 
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good governance.  Finally, Streatfield argues the paradox of control and the importance 
of management’s participative and communicative role in an organizations movement 
and transformation into the future.   
 These authors have introduced concepts of organization, governance, and 
leadership as applied by corporate organizations.  Their tools, models, and ideas have 
appropriate considerations as it pertains to SWE.  These theories and proposed practices 
are relevant to the analysis of SWE since they give a base on which the implementation 
of the enterprise concept in SWE can be examined.  Enterprise success is largely 
determined by how well an organization is aligned, managed across boundaries and 
layers, governed, and led.  These elements have become present in SWE as it has 
developed since 2005.  Since its inception, SWE has attempted to align and synchronize 
its critical elements, remove barriers between layers of the surface community through 
cross-functional teams, and create a governing body of leaders that can manage the 
direction and prioritize the objectives of the SWE.  This literature review has explained 
the relevance of these concepts as they pertain to enterprise management.  The remainder 
of the project will examine how these concepts have been implemented in Surface 
Warfare Enterprise. 
 34
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III. SURFACE WARFARE ENTERPRISE 
The SWE provides us tools to improve processes, execute streamlined business practices 
and gain effectiveness throughout our Navy to produce warfighting effectiveness. 
 
      VADM D.C. Curtis, CNSF 
      SWE 2010 Strategic Plan  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter presents the Surface Warfare Enterprise from its early initiatives and 
inception in 2005 to the present.  In order to better understand the SWE effort, this 
chapter discusses the SWE organization and processes in more detail than broadly 
presented in Chapter I.  This chapter first defines the SWE.  This definition and 
understanding is necessary before presenting how it has been developed.  It then attempts 
to capture the history of SWE by discussing the major initiatives that preceded SWE, 
how enterprise management was initially implemented, and how it has transformed since 
its development.  The chapter will provide the data necessary to answer the primary 
research question by discussing SWEs organization, governance, and leadership in detail.  
Lastly, it will identify examples related to SWE resource allocation effects, but not 
enough data will be presented to fully answer the supporting research questions.    
 Findings obtained from a range of sources are presented throughout the chapter.  
These findings were determined from data that was gathered from internal SWE training 
briefs, documents, and formal interviews to capture the history of SWE, and insights into 
how SWE works as an organization. Most of the data gathered from formal interviews 
verified what was previously researched in archival documents; however, the interviews 






B. SWE DEFINED 
 SWE is an organizational construct that uses an enterprise approach to align 
numerous organizations within the surface community in order to function as a single 
entity.81  Its goal is to supply the right force of surface warships, at the right level of 
readiness, and at the right time.82  As the surface force supplier to the FRE, the SWE 
provides warships that are ready for tasking by USFF, Commander Pacific Fleet (CPF), 
and meet the requests for forces (RFF) by Combatant Commanders.83  The enterprise 
addresses manning, maintenance, and material concerns related to surface warships, 
amphibious landing crafts (LCU, LCAC) and their crews, but does not deal with aircraft 
carriers, submarine tenders, submarine floating dry docks, and riverine warfare craft.84  
SWE is not a command.  Instead, it is an organizational instrument that provides the 
many organizations in the surface community a forum to address and solve issues that 
otherwise could not be effectively done without cross-organization collaboration. From 
this forum, SWE is able to set surface navy priorities and influence the allocation of 
resources. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT 
1. Beginning Initiatives 
 In an effort to initiate an enterprise management system in 2002, several Navy-
wide initiatives were being implemented.  Surface programs included goals and strategy 
to effect rapid changes in the way the surface navy was conducting business.  Although 
some of these programs had an immediate and measurable outcome, many of the new 
initiatives would take a few years for changes to be realized.  The initial programs 
involved surface ship maintenance and training.  
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a. SHIPMAIN 
  SHIPMAIN began in November of 2002 with a primary mission to 
improve the maintenance and modernization processes for surface vessels.  SHIPMAIN 
was responsible with achieving the following objectives: 
(1) Accomplish right work, right time, right cost. 
(2) Collaborate across enterprise stakeholders. 
(3) Work closely with regional maintenance integration. 
(4) Use proven commercial process improvement methods. 
(5) Deliver a ready fleet at a lower cost.85 
  SHIPMAIN was initiated due to the readiness crisis that navy aviation 
began experiencing in the late 1990s.86  In response to this decreasing readiness, 
aviation leaders began to work with the Thomas Group and implement process 
improvement initiatives that were used to increase production, efficiencies, and ROI. 
Thomas Group is a management consulting firm leading companies on issues of 
strategy, change, organization, operations management, and process improvement. 
ADM Clark, CNO, began to pressure the surface force about its maintenance 
requirements and budgets, so VADM Tim LaFleur, CNSF, hired the Thomas Group in 
late 2002 to help examine and reduce the cost of ship maintenance.87   Surface leaders, 
along with the Thomas Group, established a Process Improvement Team (PIT) as the 
supervisory council to observe and improve the SHIPMAIN policies and procedures.  
This team included stakeholders and key leaders throughout the surface navy.  Figure 9 
is a representation of the PIT organization: 
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Figure 9.   SHIPMAIN PIT Structure.  (From: NAVSEA SHIPMAIN Overview 
Presentation, February 2006) 
The PIT met monthly and face-to-face every quarter.  It was divided into three cross 
functional teams (CFT) shown in the figure.  Each team worked on its portion of the 
maintenance process in parallel, while the supporting Process Team ensured they stayed 
aligned.  PIT CFTs were led by two Flags, with O-6 level Action Officers, and over 
fifteen members representing multiple commands.  The CFTs would meet weekly in 
order to get things done fast, and remove organization barriers identified in the process.88   
 Prior to taking over as CNSF in March 2005, VADM Terry Etnyre led the 
SHIPMAIN Requirements CFT.89  This position exposed VADM Etnyre to enterprise 
practices and introduced him to the benefits of having a cohesive group of diverse people 
who were able to work together across stovepipe boundaries to align around common 
goals.90 
Although this program was created prior to the development of SWE, many of the 
cost cutting measures are being realized today.  In early 2006, SHIPMAIN objectives 
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were updated to reflect changes in current leadership philosophies, and policy 
requirements.  The following reflect the updated SHIPMAIN objectives: 
 Install a common planning process for surface ship and carrier 
maintenance, and modernization. 
 Increase the efficiency of the process and deliver quantifiable savings 
without compromising its effectiveness. 
 Install a disciplined management process with objective measurements. 
 Institutionalize the process and a continuous improvement method.91 
  The ultimate goal of SHIPMAIN was to maintain a consistent approach to 
shipboard maintenance.  This would create a steady stream of maintenance practices 
throughout the fleet.  A sailor attached to a ship on the west coast would notice no 
difference in maintenance policies and procedures if he transferred to the east coast. 
  In 2006, SHIPMAIN processes were expecting to show a positive effect 
on recovering dollars that can be reallocated to other programs.  Figure 10 demonstrates 
the funds that were expected to become available: 
14 SHIPMAIN
SHIPMAIN Helps USN Re-Capitalize
 Alts prioritization by TYCOM and Sponsor enables
 Informed decisions on funding increases/decreases
 Assurance that we fund the highest priorities
 Two funding reduction decisions for POM06
 Results to date: 
 Alts are ranked in priority in the POM06 Modernization Plan
 $200M returned to Big Navy over the FYDP
Funding         $M FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FYDP
Decision Jul 2004 67 67
Decision Jan 2005 26.5 24.5 24.5 18.7 18.8 20.4 133.4

























Figure 10.   SHIPMAIN Helps USN Re-Capitalize.  (From: NAVSEA SHIPMAIN 
Overview Presentation, February 2006) 
                                                 




SHIPTRAIN is a revolutionary process improvement that provides the measurement tool 
to sustain unit proficiency at the most effective and efficient level of operational 
readiness 
 
     VADM Terry Etnyre, CNSF  
     14 February 2006 
 
The CNO’s Guidance for 2004 directed a zero-based review of the Surface 
Force Inter-deployment Training Cycle (IDTC).92  This review spawned a new training 
process called SHIPTRAIN, which began in March 2004 and was implemented fleet-
wide in 2006.  This training plan took the proven methods of the IDTC and adapted them 
to fit the new readiness requirements of the Fleet Response Plan (FRP).93  The FRP was 
adopted in 2003 in response to a need for a readiness approach that would allow a high 
number of assets to deploy more quickly.  Under this plan, ships returning from 
deployment would almost immediately enter the basic training phase, which would be 
conducted before and after a ship’s depot level maintenance phase.94 SHIPTRAIN was 
developed in order for commanders to accelerate the surface training process.  
SHIPTRAIN’s primary goal was to reduce the time required to assess, train, and certify a 
ship and her crew from sixteen weeks down to four weeks.95  Several programs were 
developed to assist commanders in this process: 
(1) Unit Level Training Assessment (ULTRA) inspections 
which are scheduled every two years followed by another ULTRA assessment every six 
months.  The purpose of ULTRA is to validate the ship’s ability to self assess and train.96 
(2) Training and Operational Readiness Information Services, 
 Training Figure of Merit (TORIS/TFOM).  TORIS/TFOM gives commanding 
                                                 
92 Paul Taylor, SHIPTRAIN Revolutionizes Surface Force Training, (San Diego: Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces, 2006), 1. 
93 Taylor, SHIPTRAIN, 1. 
94 Roland Yardley et al., Impacts of the Fleet Response Plan on Surface Combatant Maintenance, 
(Washington DC: RAND, 2006), 23. 
95 Taylor, SHIPTRAIN, 1. 
96 Ibid., 1.  
 41
officers the ability to track their ship’s combat readiness and then allocate training 
resources appropriately to maintain.97  The system works on a simple red/yellow/green 
system similar to a stoplight.  Green indicates a warfare training area is within readiness 
standards, yellow indicates readiness is getting close to reaching its periodicity, while red 
indicates a warfare training area is out of current readiness standards. 
2. SWE Launch 
VADM Etnyre took over as CNSF in March 2005 with a positive outlook on the 
potential effects of enterprise practices.  Soon after assuming command, VADM Etnyre 
put enterprise behavior to work by establishing Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) oversight.  
He realized that the stovepipe command structure was not aligned with the requirements 
demanded by the LCS program.98   LCS oversight consisted of an oversight board with 
two cross-functional teams in charge of coordinating stakeholders, and developing the 
new processes required to launch a very different class of ships.99   
VADM Etnyre’s next move was to spread these emergent enterprise practices 
throughout the surface forces.  The SWE was formally established in November 2005 
when the first Surface Board of Directors and three process teams met in Washington 
D.C. and conducted the first board meeting.100  The intent of the enterprise model was to 
use enterprise behavior as a tool to understand processes, and align the organization to 
execute those processes in a way that allows it to be monitored using certain metrics.101  
With SWE, VADM Etnyre was careful not simply re-apply the TQM initiatives that saw 
minimal results in the 1990s.102  The impact he liked most from SHIPMAIN and wanted 
applied to SWE was the effect process mapping and information transparency had on 
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enabling leaders outside his direct command to understand the importance of their 
activities in a larger process and expand their sense of ownership in the role they have in 
producing the desired output.103   
SWEs development can be attributed to factors both internal and external to the 
surface navy, which are listed below: 
 Process improvement programs and initiatives of navy aviation. 
 Large gaps between desired and actual funding levels. 
 Inefficient and ineffective consumption of resources. 
 Sea Enterprise initiative from CNO ADM Clarks Sea Power 21 concept. 
 Pressure from the CNO to answer maintenance and cost related questions. 
 Success of the PIT in the SHIPMAIN initiative. 
 The formal establishment of the NAE in 2004. 
 The experiences of the Thomas Group. 
 A realized need for new organizational and cultural behavior.104 
By the end of 2006, SWE initiatives were already projecting to achieve tangible 
savings.  Figure 11 details the projected savings determined in October 2006: 
 
 
Figure 11.   Total Projected SWE Savings and Cost Avoidance. (From: Perkins, 2007). 
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3. NAE Influence 
Much of SWEs initial implementation of enterprise practices was influenced by 
the NAE.  In 1998, aviation leaders began working with the Thomas Group as its 
production consultant to help fix the costly training cycle of pilots through the Naval 
Aviation Production Process Improvement (NAPPI) program.105  The first agreement that 
Thomas Group made with senior aviation leadership was that they must change the way 
they did business.106  This relationship and Thomas Group’s strategic way of thinking 
ultimately led to the development of the NAE in 2004.   
The NAE organization is modeled after a corporate structure and is diagramed in 
Figure 12. It is comprised of a Board of Directors (BOD) with a six member executive 
steering committee composed of Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) as the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO); Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) as the 
Chief Operations Officer (COO); Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL) as the 
Enterprise Readiness Officer; Total Force Readiness Officer (AIR 1.0 NAVAIR) for 
policy and personnel; a Chief Financial Officer (CFO)(AIR 6.8, NAVAIR) and OPNAV 
N88 for acquisition and procurement.107  This organizational structure is similar to the 
SHIPMAIN PIT, which was also influenced by the Thomas Group, and adopted by SWE.  
A key relationship in this model is between CNAF and NAVAIR.  CNAF and NAVAIR 
work very closely together, a similar relationship that would be developed with CNSF 
and NAVSEA. 
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Figure 12.   Naval Aviation Enterprise Structure. (From:  Robert Williams, NPS Thesis, 
June 2007) 
4. SWE Development November 2005–March 2008 
 After SWEs initial meeting in November 2005, the first task was to lay the 
groundwork for how it was going to operate.  The first half of 2006 was devoted to 
collecting baseline data and developing a strategic plan that clearly identified what the 
desired effects would be, and the objectives required to meet them.108  SWE was 
established as a strategic level organization with the primary objective of providing 
warships ready for tasking.  Strategic objectives were developed and laid out in the first 
SWE Strategic Plan.  These six strategic objectives drive enterprise efforts within the 
organization.  The SWE objectives are aimed at making smart decisions that will have 
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long term impact and sustain current readiness while managing a fiscally challenged 
environment.109  Below is a list of the objectives which are still in place today.  
 Produce prescribed levels of warfighting readiness based on USFF defined 
demand signals. 
 Deliver and retain a diverse mix of officers, enlisted, civilians and 
contractors with the right competencies and proficiencies, in the right 
place, at the right time, for the right value – balancing cost and readiness 
while adhering to SWE values. 
 Mature the enterprise financial management process that enables the SWE 
to allocate and manage more effectively its financial resources to support 
current readiness and future capabilities.   
 Implement standardized cost management processes and financial metrics 
to drive increased productivity (cost/readiness). 
 Reduce total ownership costs (TOC) across the SWE.  
 Improve enterprise maturity and execution through the development of 
relationships with SWE partners, in particular providers and enablers.110 
 The second half of 2006 was largely devoted to establishing the Class Squadrons 
(CLASSRON).  VADM Etnyre established eight CLASSRONs that represented and 
supported ships of the same class.  These organizational entities were to focus efforts 
across the entire enterprise and be the interface between the SWE and the fleet.111  
CLASSRONs are functional commands that represent each class of ship and are led by 
Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (SURFLANT) who also serves as the SWE 
Chief Readiness Officer (CRO).  CLASSRONs represent each class of ship in SWE and 
identify readiness issues related to a specific class.  The ship’s CLASSRON will then 
work with SWE cross functional teams to develop and implement a solution that ensures 
maximum readiness. As stated in the SWE 2008 Strategic Plan, the three goals of the 
CLASSRONs are: 
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 The CLASSRON will leverage cross-functional capability through the 
SHIPMAIN and SHIPTRAIN program processes 
 The expected outcome is a cadre of subject matter experts organized by 
classes of ships that will provide greater effectiveness across the SWE. 
 Imperative to the success of CLASSRONS is to ensure that manning 
matches the required functions they will be performing.  As their functions 
increase or change, it will be necessary for their manning to adjust 
accordingly.  This will be done either by increasing in size, decreasing in 
size, leveraging provider/enabler commands or any other manner deemed 
appropriate to match functions with tasks.112 
 CLASSRONs are geographically located in the following fleet concentration 
areas: San Diego, CA (LCS, LSD, LPD-17, CG, and MCM) Norfolk, VA 
(LCAC/LCU/LCM, DDG, PC, LHA/LHD/LPD, and FFG).  CLASSRONs are 
responsible to CNSF for the following: 
 Report to Deputy Commander Naval Surface Forces (DCNSF)/CRO and 
work’s with both CNSF/CNSL Type Commander (TYCOM) and 
Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) to support their ship class 
 Identify root cause issues which degrade readiness and work with 
supporting organizations to develop solutions and track implementation 
and progress 
 Resource prioritization 
 TYCOM Agent across manning, training and equipment 
 Process improvement and trend analysis113 
 Figure 13 shows the CLASSRON relationship between the enterprise and the 
fleet. 
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Figure 13.   CLASSRON Enterprise and Fleet Relationship.  (From:  Joint Industry 
Navy Improvements Initiative Meeting Presentation, 2007) 
 In the beginning stages, emphasis was first put on the SWE as a business model 
with business terminology applied to SWE activities.  This is illustrated by the labeling of 
SWE positions were given: Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer 
(COO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and the Surface Board was also first labeled the 
Board of Directors.114  This setup mirrored the NAE and represented Thomas Group’s 
corporate as for-profit business way of thinking.  It also associated the SWE organization 
with an attempt to run the surface navy like a business. This new business model and way 
of thinking spawned confusion as to whether or not effects on ship readiness could be 
attributed to Type Commander decisions or the Enterprise.115 
5. SWE Development March 2008–Current 
 In March 2008, VADM D.C. Curtis took over as CNSF and leader of SWE.  His 
previous tenure as SURFLANT and Chief Readiness Officer (CRO) to the SWE gave 
him insight to how the enterprise was operating.  In this same month, SWE also saw a 
change in strategic consultants.  Booz Allen Hamilton took over from the Thomas Group 
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as the primary SWE consultants.  This transition took place without any turnover and 
brought a significant change in the working methodologies of the SWE.116  The Thomas 
Group provided strategic support and was collocated with SWE personnel three days a 
week, operating primarily from Texas.117 Booz Allen is collocated with the SWE five 
days a week in all major regions: Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; Mayport, FL; and 
Washington, D.C.  Booz Allen gives SWE the same strategic support as Thomas Group 
did, but has also taken a much more tactical role by assisting the government employees 
in the execution of the suggestions they recommend.118 
 Change in the SWE commander and strategic consultants marked a change in 
SWE direction. In June 2008, the SWE Executive Committee (EXCOMM), Surface 
Board, and Senior Executive Service (SES) members held a strategic planning session.  
During this meeting, the 2006 Strategic Plan was updated with no major objective 
changes; however, some underlying initiatives for each strategic objective were 
changed.119  The SWE charter was also developed which assigned major roles and 
responsibilities and battle rhythm of the organization.120 
 With new direction set, VADM Curtis began to focus on changing the tone of the 
enterprise.121  Instead of being focused on business practices and efficiencies, he wanted 
the focus to be cooperation and collaboration of people throughout the enterprise.122  
Since 2008, VADM Curtis has taken the SWE from a focus on running like a business, to 




                                                 









SWE as a business, enterprise practices have now become a behavior within a 
warfighting organization in order to provide warships ready for tasking, and maintain a 
holistic view of the force.124 
 In October 2010, CLASSRON functions officially transitioned to N code Type 
Commander responsibilities.  This restructuring has taken place to ensure clearer lines of 
accountability since CLASSRONs were developed without direct decision making 
authority.  The functionality that the CLASSRONs provided are important to SWEs 
ability to recognize and act on trending problems within a class of ship, so it was 
important to retain the benefits CLASSRONs provided to the SWE.125  Appendix A 
presents a timeline that captures the SWE history and progression of enterprise practices. 
6. Enterprise Maturity Model 
SWE’s sixth and last strategic objective is focused on improving SWEs maturity 
as an enterprise organization.  One of the tools the Thomas Group brought to the SWE 
was the Enterprise Maturity Model (EMM).126  The EMM was described by the Thomas 
Group as an enterprise analysis, governance, and audit tool.127  It was adopted by the 
SWE in 2006 and tailored to fit the surface navy goals with the intent of jumpstarting 
SWE enterprise efforts.128   The EMM can be compared to the Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (CMMI), which was developed by the Software Engineering Institute 
at Carnegie Mellon and used by more than five thousand organizations worldwide.129  
The SWE EMM is broken into two parts with six categories each.  For each category, 
there are associated columns that define the level; the higher the level, the greater the 
competency for that specific category.  Levels one to two typically represent the 
foundational elements of a category, which are the basic tools and structures needed in 
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order to be successful at the higher levels, levels three to five.130  The first part focuses 
on enterprise management characteristics and how an enterprise should be governed and 
led.  Figure 14 shows these categories with their level five goals, and examples. 
 
Figure 14.   EMM Management Rows (From: Commander, Naval Surface Forces. 
EMM Presentation, 2008) 
The second part of the EMM describes the execution and results an enterprise needs to 
practice.  Figure 15 shows these categories. 
                                                 
130 D.C. Curtis, interview. 
 51
 
Figure 15.   EMM Execution and Results Rows. (From: Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces. EMM Presentation, 2008) 
This model has been the tool used by the SWE since its early stages to assess the SWEs 
progress towards becoming a more mature enterprise.  This model is presented at surface 
board meetings to give SWE leaders a better idea of where the organization stands, and 
how it is maturing as an enterprise.  These figures are only a snapshot of the entire twelve 
by five matrix.  The entire SWE EMM can be viewed in Appendix B.131 
D. ORGANIZATION AND ALIGNMENT  
 Figure 16 shows the current SWE organizational structure. It is comprised of a 
surface board with a ten member senior executive committee (EXCOMM).  The surface 
board is supported by five CFTs; titled Future Capabilities Team (FCT), Future 
Readiness Team (FRT), Personnel Readiness Team (PRT), Strategic Financial 
Management Team (SFMT), and Current Readiness Team (CRT).  Each team is chaired 
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by a member of the Surface Board.  SWE is headed by CNSF with the support of the 
EXCOMM, Surface Board, and SWE Deputy Commander.  Although still very similar to 
the SHIPMAIN and NAE structure, it has expanded since 2005 by adding two additional 
future focused CFTs, supporting teams, and additional surface board members. 
 
 
Figure 16.   SWE Organization.  (From:  Commander, Naval Surface Forces SWE 101 
Training Presentation, 2009) 
1. Horizontal Elements 
 SWE’s organization has both horizontal and vertical elements.  The horizontal 
element is seen at the CFT level.  This element is organized to eliminate boundaries 
within the surface navy, and allow for collaboration across the entire organization.  
Through this style of management, SWE is able to remove barriers within the 
organization and incorporate the right people into the decision making process.  CFTs are 
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put together with personnel (military and civilian) from stakeholder commands to 
improve and manage the key processes related to the focus area of that specific team.  
There are a total of five major CFTs which were stated above.  Below are the descriptions 
of each CFT taken from the SWE Charter: 
 Future Capabilities Team (FCT) – led by the OPNAV Director of Surface 
Warfare (N86) and focuses on the delivery of affordable and effective 
capabilities that are appropriate for meeting a broad array of future 
challenges. 
 Future Readiness Team (FRT) – led by Sea 21 and focuses on the 
optimization of support processes to deliver the required current and future 
readiness. 
 Personnel Readiness Team (PRT) – led by CNSF Vice Commander and 
PERS 41 and focuses on delivering and retaining a diverse mix of officers, 
enlisted, civilians, and contractors with the right competencies and 
proficiencies. 
 Strategic Financial Management Team (SFMT) – led by CNSF SES 
Executive Director and OPNAV N86B with the objective of making and 
influencing effective financial policy, management, stewardship, and 
program decisions. 
 Current Readiness Team (CRT) – led by COMNAVSURFLANT and 
focuses on the current readiness of surface force manning, training, and 
equipment issues.132 
 There are also three additional teams that provide support across the five CFTs.  
These teams are the Overarching Metrics Team, Strategic Communications Team, and 
Surface Team One.  Below are the descriptions of each support team taken from the SWE 
Charter: 
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 Overarching Metrics Team (OMT) – led by CNSF N8A and provides 
consistent, replicable, and integrated SWE performance measures in a 
standard format to help support the Surface Board decision making 
process.  
 Strategic Communications Team (SCT) – led by the SWE Deputy and 
centralizes and prioritizes communication tasks and goals through long-
term planning and utilizations of communication tools. 
 Surface Team One (ST1) – led by Deputy Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces and focuses on improving cross organizational maintenance 
processes in order to maintain and modernize the surface navy, meet 
expected ship service life, and address current material readiness 
challenges.133 
 Each team has the capacity to set up a Barrier Removal Team (BRT).  A BRT is 
chartered by the SWE Deputy and CFT leaders.134   These teams are temporary in nature 
and stood up for a specific purpose.  They are authorized to accomplish their given task 
then demobilize.  A BRT focuses on the removal of a specific barrier(s) once it has been 
identified. 
2. Vertical Elements 
 The vertical element ensures that SWE strategy can be turned into meaningful 
work by providing flow of information and tasking.  This element allows strategy, 
concerns, and decisions to flow to the lowest level possible.  Since SWE is a strategic 
level organization, deck plate sailors are affected by products of the SWE process and not 
actually part of its vertical element.135  This vertical structure is best understood by 
illustrating how SWE addresses issues that are raised by the waterfront.  Figure 17 shows 
the vertical alignment of SWE’s organization: 
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Figure 17.   SWE Vertical Alignment. 
 The SWE strategic plan establishes the strategic objectives, and underlying 
initiatives from which the enterprise operates.  These objectives have remained constant 
since SWE began in 2005.  When the strategic plan was updated in 2008, VADM Curtis 
also had the SWE develop a charter that assigned specific roles and responsibilities, and 
established the battle rhythm of surface board and CFT meetings.  Annual Plans are 
developed for every fiscal year and is a tactical plan of yearly actions from which the 
CFTs operate.  These plans are derived from the strategic objectives and initiatives laid 
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out in the strategic plan, and mandated by the charter.  The annual plan identifies the 
specific intentions, guidance, and deliverables for each CFT.  This all comes together in a 
recurring drumbeat of monthly surface board and EXCOMM meetings.  CFT leaders 
update the surface board on the status of items in their respective annual plans.  New 
issues and concerns are also brought up by the type desks and CFTs, which are addressed 
by the board.  If warranted, an action item in progress (AIP) will be issued with an 
identification number and assigned to a CFT for action.  The CFT can address the AIP by 
standing up a BRT, which will identify any organizational barriers that have contributed 
to the problem, and determine a solution.  The AIP solution is then presented to the 
surface board by the responsible CFT leader and is either closed (solution agreed on by 
all board members) or elevated to the EXCOMM for further consideration.   
 This vertical alignment of strategy and execution allows the lowest levels of the 
SWE to turn large strategy into meaningful work.  It also provides leadership with 
necessary feedback of information to update or even change the strategic objectives if 
required.  
E. GOVERNANCE 
The surface board is the governing body of the SWE. It consists of flag officers 
and SES leaders that represent the key commands within the SWE.136  These stakeholder 
commands are active participants in the processes that supply ready warships.  Figure 16 
lists the commands that have a seat in the surface board and identifies the members who 
also make up the EXCOMM.  
1. Surface Board Responsibilities  
 The 2010 SWE Charter details the roles and responsibilities of the surface board 
and its members.  The following outlines the duties of the surface board as designated by 
the charter: 
 Align and prioritize Surface Warfare Objectives and action items to meet 
Combatant Commander and USFF/CPF requirements. 
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 Approve, Direct, and prioritize changes to business processes to improve 
readiness at the right cost and timeframe. 
 Review and approve updates to the Strategic Plan, Charter, and Annual 
Plan. 
 Make funding decisions for People, Equipment, Supply, Training, and 
Ordnance (PESTO) pillars with respect to future capability and current 
readiness. 
 Serve as the governing body that CFTs forward barriers to for 
resolution.137 
2. Membership 
The SWE charter does not specifically state who must sit on the surface board.  
The guidance for what actually constitutes membership on the surface board is very 
loose.138  These governing documents deliberately permit a wide amount of latitude as to 
who is going to be on the board because of the regularly occurring drumbeat.139  The 
meeting schedule is set a year out with a loose knit guidance of what is going to be 
discussed.140  Certain items up for discussion may require the presence of a command not 
normally represented at the board, but necessary for specific items.  Or it may be 
determined that an emergent issue is best suited to be addressed directly up and down the 
chain of command for a quick response. 
3. SWE Governance Support 
The administrative office that directly supports the SWE Commander and 
management of surface board is the N40 SWE Support Office.  N40 is manned with only 
three or four permanent officers assigned, an O6 SWE Executive Assistant, O4 
Maintenance Analyst, supporting junior officers, and co-located Booz Allen consultants.  
N40 works directly for CNSF and enforces the regularly occurring drumbeat of 
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evolutions that bring all the board members and stakeholders together.141  This can be a 
challenge because surface board members also have their normal job responsibilities that 
can produce competing priorities when trying to get thirty flag officer equivalents, in the 
same place, at the same time, talking about the same issues.142  N40 also manages what is 
brought before the board by working across the different CFTs and making sure they all 
know what the expectations are, and that the right questions are being answered.143  By 
acting as the SWE Commanders gatekeepers and disciplinarians, N40 is a key component 
to SWE governance and management of the surface board drumbeat. 
F. LEADERSHIP 
The decisions that are made here are the SWE priorities, because we get together and 
talk about it.  We weigh them, and we discuss them to ensure that these are priorities 
about the fleet. 
 
      VADM D.C. Curtis, CNSF 
      15 September 2010 
 
 The key to SWE success is the belief in what the enterprise is capable of 
achieving.144  Members within SWE must have a level of trust that allows them to voice 
their challenges and issues without reprisal. The two key leadership positions that provide 
the direction for the organization are the SWE Commander and Deputy Commander.  
Their responsibilities as detailed in the charter are listed below: 
1. SWE Commander (CNSF) 
 Establishes the SWE strategic direction. 
 Promotes the SWE agenda to the FRE. 
 Ensures SWE Deputy Commander and CFT leaders are aligned with SWE 
direction and guidance. 
                                                 





 Approves SWE policy, procedures, business rules, roles and 
responsibilities. 
 Sets agenda for Surface Board and EXCOMM meetings.145 
 Establishes SWE battle rhythm. 
2. SWE Deputy Commander (NAVSEA) 
 Collaborates with SWE Commander on establishing SWE direction. 
 Orchestrates activities to execute the Strategic Plan, Charter, and Annual 
Plan. 
 Assists in development of top level issues and ensures they are addressed 
at the appropriate level. 
 Gives guidance, direction, and tools to CFTs. 
 Charters Barrier Removal Teams (BRT) for priority tasks to remove 
barriers. 
 Facilitates Surface Board meeting agendas. 
 Ensures elevation of barriers to the Surface Board for resolution. 
 Oversees collaboration between CFT action items.146 
3. CFT Leadership 
Composition of the CFTs is also important to the success of SWE.  The CFT 
leaders must have experience and knowledge that is relevant to the mission of that CFT.  
These leaders must be willing to openly discuss their problems, and have trust and 
confidence in other SWE leaders.  If these leaders do not subscribe to the enterprise and 
its processes, then it is likely that the SWE will be less successful.147  One factor that 
makes the distribution of leadership within the SWE difficult is the constant turnover 
within the ranks.   
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An important aspect in maintaining the right distribution of leadership and 
determining a position that will best suit the enterprise, is knowing what a leaders beliefs 
are, and from what angle they see enterprise behavior.  Currently, SWE has a body of 
members that believe in the enterprise and are able to foster the behavior that makes 
enterprise practices successful in the surface navy culture.148  Success of the SWE hinges 
on its leaders at all levels of the organization. 
G. RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
 The effect SWE has on resource allocation is not one of direct control.  In reality, 
the SWE commander does not control most of the surface navy resources.  Instead, SWE 
affects resource allocation through influence.  By establishing the priorities of the surface 
fleet, and discussing these priorities amongst the key stakeholders, the SWE is able to 
influence where resources should be allocated first.   
1. Money 
SWE has had an effect on money.  Before the SWE, money traveled in pipes with 
stovepipe thinking and behavior.149  With members of those stovepipes now belonging to 
the SWE, it is the same people just with more understanding and awareness of the 
priorities.150  This is illustrated through the incorporation of OPNAV N43 Fleet 
Readiness Division into the enterprise.  N43 became a member of the surface board and 
action officers on the Future Readiness Team.  N43 remained in control of the 1B4B 
maintenance funding, but by being part of the enterprise, N43 is now forced to 
collaborate with NAVSEA program managers for various classes of ships and weapon 
systems.151  In terms of execution, 1B4B has stayed with N43 but was drawn into the 
influence of the enterprise. 
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 Enterprise behavior is largely focused on meeting long term goals.  Money has to 
be earmarked and allocated years in advance to meet the needs of the surface navy.  
However, events develop that leave a command with a surplus of funds or in need of 
funds.  SWE influences the allocation of money through conversations and decisions that 
are made during surface board meetings. Commands that are in need of additional 
funding express their desire during the surface board meeting through an AIP or CFT 
request.  That need is then analyzed to see if there is a specific problem that is unique to 
one ship, an entire class, or a general problem that is affecting an entire fleet?  Once this 
process is settled funds and or recommended policy changes are presented and a decision 
is made.   
 SWE also puts in their priorities on an annual basis for the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM).152  Since these priorities are discussed and decided on by the 
surface board, it ensures that individual commands are not acting independently.  The 
flow of money is no longer about which program manager has the loudest voice, but 
which one the entire body of SWE decides are the right priorities to spend money on.  
The SFMT is led by an SES who ensures this happens.  The SFMT coordinates across all 
OPNAV Resource Sponsors and Budget Submitting Offices (BSOs) to ensure SWE 
priorities are addressed and represented in the POM and Program Reviews (PR).153  
2. Manning 
 Manpower and manning is the largest cost the navy faces and is the SWEs 
number one priority.154  The PRT is charged with ensuring the right levels and quality of 
manning is present throughout the surface force.  The largest flaw in the early business 
style approach taken before SWE was not realizing that war fighting requires excess 
capacity.155  Past initiatives have looked to reduce the manning to optimal levels, which 
really focused on the minimum level.  DDGs first deployed with approximately 320 
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sailors, where now some have deployed with 220 sailors.156  If there is not excess 
capacity, the navy may not be able to fulfill a required mission.  In business, inventory 
costs money so reducing it through just in time practices meant saving that money.  The 
business practices applied to the surface navy prior to SWEs development focused on 
minimums, including the minimum people required to man a ship.157  These programs 
were developed to look at the manning and ships and attempt to reduce it, while 
maintaining a required level of readiness.   
a. Top Six Roll Down 
  In order to lower the operational cost of a warship, the top six roll down 
program was developed.  This initiative reduced the manning of E-4 to E-9 personnel on 
ships with the intent of lowering the cost of manning.  In reality, the top six roll down 
took experienced sailors off of ships.  For example, on a DDG the Quartermaster Chief 
(QMC) was the senior quartermaster onboard.  This program rolled that billet down to a 
Quartermaster First Class (QM1) and the manning document authorized one QM1. The 
potential of gaining a person who is a rank above or below the authorized billet meant 
that a lead quartermaster on a DDG could possibly be a second class petty officer.158  
This affected the amphibious fleet hardest with the loss of experienced engineman (EN).  
ENs with no main diesel propulsion experience were being put in engineering plants 
where the main propulsion was diesel engines, and expected to be the leading petty 
officer (LPO).  Phase II of this program was going to be implemented, but was stopped 
due to SWEs recognition of the negative effect removal of experience sailors was having 
on ships.159 
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b. Optimal Manning 
  The optimal manning concept was a study designed to reduce the Total 
Ownership Cost (TOC) per ship.  The largest cost in TOC is Operations and Support 
(O&S).  O & S represents seventy percent of ships TOC.  Of that seventy percent, fifty-
one percent falls under manning.160  When this program was developed it did not take 
into account the excess capacity required to effectively man and maintain a surface 
combatant.  This problem was identified by SWE leadership in 2008 after the POM 10 
budget was already done.161 Instead, it was reviewed and put into the POM 12 budget. 
Manning problems were largely identified by the SWE in 2008 and now 2200 sailors are 
returning to the fleet in 2011.162  Much of the work that was done by the SWE in 2008 is 
beginning to pay off now which shows the time it takes to identify a program, allocate 
money to it, and effect change. 
H. SUMMARY 
 This chapter first presented a broad context of the SWE.   It then discussed two 
important initiatives that began prior to SWE’s development, SHIPMAIN and 
SHIPTRAIN.  SHIPMAIN is significant because it was VADM LaFleur’s first 
application of enterprise business practices in the surface navy.  This led into the 
discussion of SWEs initial launch, and how the NAE and Thomas Group heavily 
influenced the formation of the SWE.  It also listed the external and internal factors that 
led to SWEs development. 
 The chapter then looked at SWEs progression during the tenure of VADM Etnyre 
and the current SWE Commander, VADM Curtis.  During the first two years of SWE 
operations, a lot of the work was focused on gathering the right data, and developing the 
strategic plan of the organization.  CLASSRONs were also begun within the first year to 
be the interface between the SWE and the fleet.  SWE leaders were given corporate 
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labeled positions and became associated with attempting to run the surface navy as a 
business.  March 2008 was an important month for SWE as it marked a dramatic shift in 
enterprise direction.  VADM Curtis has sought to change the tone of the enterprise by 
using enterprise behavior practices in a warfighting organization focused on 
effectiveness, and not so much on efficiency.  A timeline was also presented to help 
illustrate SWE’s evolution along with major enterprise milestones in the larger navy. 
 A small section about the Enterprise Maturity Model was also presented in order 
to provide an understanding of the primary oversight tool that SWE uses to determine its 
ability to operate as an enterprise.  The EMM is important to understand because it is 
how SWE assesses itself as it attempts to mature. 
 The next section of the chapter focused on SWE’s organization and alignment.  
First, an organizational chart showed all elements of the SWE organization.  The 
horizontal element and its importance in removing organizational barriers were 
explained.  The roles and responsibilities of the cross-functional and supporting teams 
were all defined.  The vertical element of the organization was presented through a flow 
chart illustrating how SWE strategy is pushed to the lowest level of the enterprise.  It also 
made the distinction that SWE is a strategic organization where sailors on the deck plates 
are recipients of the SWE decision-making process. 
 Governance was addressed by looking at the membership and role of SWE’s 
governing body, the surface board.  It outlined the responsibilities and membership of the 
board.  This section also explained the looseness of the governing documents in SWE’s 
attempt to remain flexible given the frequency of meetings, and possible conflicting 
priorities board members may have with their normal job responsibilities.  The role that 
the N40 SWE Support office plays in managing the governing body is also important. 
 The leadership section began with a quote from the SWE Commander, VADM 
Curtis, which illustrates what SWE leadership must be able to do.  An important 
characteristic SWE leaders must have is the ability to be open, honest, and discuss items 
important to the surface navy.  SWE can only be led by leaders who believe in what the 
enterprise is capable of achieving.  The responsibilities of the two key leadership 
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positions, the SWE Commander and Deputy Commander were presented, along with a 
discussion of leadership distribution throughout the entire organization, but more 
specifically, the CFTs. 
 The final section of the chapter attempted to explain how SWE is able to effect 
resource allocation through influence and establishment of priorities.  Specific examples 
of effects on money and manning were specified, however, this data is not sufficient 
enough to show how SWE affects the systematic process of resource allocation.  A more 
detailed explanation and recommended areas for further research are provided in the 
concluding chapter.   
 Throughout this chapter, findings from archival research and interview data were 
presented in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions of the project.  
These findings provide a clear understanding of how SWE has implemented enterprise 
management, how it is organized, governed, led, and some effects these practices are 
having on resource allocation.  This understanding will provide the foundation for 
analysis and assessment of SWE’s implementation of enterprise management in the 
following chapters. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SWE ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides an analysis of SWE based on an analytical framework 
drawn from the corporate literature presented in chapter two.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, SWE has implemented enterprise practices at a strategic level.  Surface 
leaders use enterprise management as a behavioral tool to ensure cross-organizational 
collaboration, and attempt to influence resource allocation throughout the entire force.  In 
an attempt to maximize this influence, SWE has applied practices common to corporate 
enterprises. The purpose of the analysis is to assess SWE’s implementation of enterprise 
organization, governance, and leadership practices in relation to ideas and models 
common to these successful business enterprises.  Each section will begin with a 
framework table to organize the topics being analyzed.  At the end of each section a 
review table will be presented that summarizes how SWE has implemented those specific 
topics.  
The chapter will first analyze SWE’s organization.  This section will focus on 
analyzing SWE’s main thing, its vertical and horizontal elements, and three levels of 
management.  The next part of the chapter will focus on governance by analyzing the 
culture of the surface board, its performance, and communicative interaction.  The last 
section will analyze SWE’s distribution of leadership throughout the organization.   
B. ANALYSIS OF SWE ORGANIZATION 
 This section will focus on analyzing the concepts of organization and alignment.  
First, Labovitz and Rosansky present ideas on alignment that raise a few questions.  What 
is the organizations main thing? Are vertical and horizontal elements present that ensure 
the organization stays centered on that main thing? Second, according to Burton and 
Moran, three levels of management must be present for an organization to remain focused 
on the future and meet long-term objectives.  Table 1 is the framework that will be used 



















Table 1. Framework for Analysis of SWE Organization. 
1. SWE’s Main Thing 
 SWE’s main thing is ensuring warships are ready for tasking, at the right cost, 
right place, and right time.  This is stated in the 2010 strategic plan and is found in 
numerous SWE publications.  It has been its focusing statement since 2005.  It is SWE’s 
most powerful expression of what it hopes to accomplish and is a common and unifying 
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Analysis Topics Definition 
Main Thing 
The single most powerful expression of what 
it hopes to accomplish, a common and 
unifying concept to which every unit can 
contribute. 
Vertical Element 
All employees understand organization-wide 
goals and their role in achieving them.  
Strategy converted to meaningful work at the 
lowest level.  
Horizontal Element 
Eliminates the boundaries within the 
organization. Incorporates the right people 
into the decision making process. 
Strategic Management 
A permanent structure in an organization, 
focused on the development and deployment 
of strategic goals to all levels of the daily 
management work units. 
Lateral Management 
Alliance based structure, concentrates on 
organization wide goals and objectives, 
develops solutions that break down barriers. 
Daily Management 
A permanent but routine structure, focuses on 
the routine daily work that converts inputs into 
outputs, continuously improves routine 
processes, comprises a majority of the 
employees, internally focused but should be 
ready to adapt as the organization strategic 
management changes direction or emphasis. 
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successful CEOs, Labovitz and Rosansky were able to identify five simple steps to 
determine and align an organization to the main thing.  Two of these steps relevant to this 
analysis were: 
 Define critical strategic goals and imperatives and deploy them throughout 
the organization. 
 Tie performance measures and metrics to those goals.164 
SWE determined its main thing in conjunction with strategic objectives and 
initiatives that would drive the organization toward that main thing.  These objectives 
have remained in place since 2006 while the supporting initiatives have had minimal 
changes.  SWE also developed metrics and performance measures that were tied to its 
goals.  An example of this is the Enterprise Maturity Model, which is used to assess the 
progress of the SWE as an enterprise.  In addition to the EMM, SWE has also developed 
numerous metrics related to results, cost, and processes.  Examples of each type of metric 
are Maintenance Figure of Merit (MFOM), First Pass Yield, and Fuel Costs per Month.  
These metrics are used to identify trends, and determine whether or not action is 
necessary to achieve the main thing.  Each CFT has metrics and performance measures 
tied to the goals of their specific CFT as well.   
 SWE’s ultimate goal is to have a mature enterprise where everyone, at every level 
is moving in the same direction.  At a strategic level, this is beginning to happen.  The 
establishment of a battle rhythm where decision makers from each major surface navy 
organization and command are together every month creates a sense of direction and 
purpose among the senior leaders.  This has allowed the surface board to better align 
resources and systems to ensure they are integrated and focused on SWEs main thing.   
According to Labovitz and Rosansky, constant connection to the main thing is 
vital to an organizations success.  To achieve this, managers and workers alike must be 
linked to the main thing, and must understand their role in contributing to it.  Right now, 
sailors are recipients of the SWE process and not directly incorporated into the 
organization.  This is intentional since enterprise practices were implemented at a 
strategic level to fix the stovepipe decision-making that was degrading ship readiness.  
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However, Labovitz and Rosansky state that to be truly aligned, all levels of the 
organization must link elements of strategy and people to customers and process 
improvements to ensure everyone understands the main thing.  Early process 
improvement initiatives such as TQM and business re-engineering failed to link people to 
the main thing and led to a lot of teams, working on a lot of problems, but with no real 
connection to the main thing.165  Figure 18 takes the model presented by Labovitz and 
Rosansky in chapter two and, applies it to the existing relationship of these elements to 
SWE’s main thing. 
 
Figure 18.   SWE Element Links to its Main Thing. 
a. Strategy 
Strategy and objectives have remained connected to the main thing since 
2006.  The surface board reviewed and updated the strategic objectives in 2008 and 2010.   
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b. Processes 
Processes are beginning to provide more output.  A consistent schedule of 
surface board meetings allows decision makers to present unified priorities for POM 
inputs.  SWE is also able to better track individual ships and ship classes through review 
of metrics.  For example, SWE can see every cruiser that spends the most money, least 
money, has the most CASREPS, and how they are compared to the rest of the class.  This 
holistic view has given SWE the ability to improve maintenance and training cycles for 
each class of ship.   
c. Customers 
SWE is a force provider to FFC and the Combatant Commanders. Thus 
FFC and the CoComs can be viewed as the SWE’s customers.  In 2008, SWE leadership 
identified the negative effect that a combination of simultaneous initiatives (manning 
reduction, training reform, and streamlining of maintenance) developed separately from 
one another in the early 2000s was having on ships readiness.  This trend became evident 
from 2005 through 2009 in which fourteen percent of ships failed INSURV, compared to 
three and a half percent from 1994 through 1999.166  In its attempt to remain aligned with 
its primary customer, FFC, SWE has addressed these concerns by re-allocating resources 
to ensure ships are ready for the inspection, and focused on effectiveness.  So far this has 
resulted in zero INSURV failures for FY 2010.167  SWE is also returning 2,200 billets to 
ships in an attempt to increase ship manning to levels required for effective ship 
operation and maintenance.  Since 2008, SWE has been focused on correcting the 
negative effects stove piped initiatives have had on the fleet, and improving its alignment 
with FFC. 
d. People 
SWE has been able to successfully incorporate multiple command 
structures throughout the surface navy into a cohesive organization.  CFTs have been able 
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to work across the organization and involve personnel from different levels of the surface 
navy. SWE has been able to effectively employ enterprise management at a senior and 
strategic level.  Currently, deck plate sailors, mainly O-3 division officers and below, 
have had minimal or no exposure to the SWE.  It is not necessary that every sailor know 
details about the SWE, but in order to align the people element of the surface navy, 
Labovitz and Rosansky would argue that sailors at all levels should have an 
understanding of how they contribute to what the SWE is trying accomplish.  Sailors 
should also know that their leadership is willing to openly discuss issues so decisions and 
priorities have the best interest of the fleet in mind. 
 2. Vertical and Horizontal Elements 
 SWE’s ability to recognize the interrelated programs that were severely impacting 
ship readiness illustrates the capacity it has to center the organization. According to 
Labovitz and Rosansky, the ability to remain centered relies on a combination of vertical 
and horizontal elements in an organization.168 
Currently, SWE is horizontally organized and aligned through CFTs.  These CFTs 
are removing barriers within the organization and incorporating the right people into the 
decision making process.  The organization of this horizontal element allows CFTs to be 
empowered by their leaders, and make decisions so the SWE can move forward.169  
The SWE is also showing aspects of vertical alignment.  According to Labovitz 
and Rosansky, the vertical dimension is concerned with organizational strategy and the 
people that are relied on daily to transform strategy into meaningful work.  They also 
state that when executive level leaders and managers develop strategies in isolation from 
the people who execute them, it is inevitable that the strategies will not be successfully 
incorporated into the environment of the low level employees.  SWE strategy is 
determined, tracked, and updated through the surface board, in which inputs are given 
from key stakeholders throughout different levels of the surface community.  However, 
full vertical alignment is not reached until all employees (sailors) understand 
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organization-wide goals and their role in achieving them.  A similar separation was 
present when Navy leadership began implementing the FRP.  A GAO report published in 
2005 cited that although the FRP was communicated heavily to senior leaders, the plan 
did not flow through the lower level ranks, which led to personnel not being aware of the 
scope, goal, and other aspects of the plan.170 
3. Levels of Management  
 A factor in SWE’s success is its ability to move the surface navy into the future, 
and achieve the long-term goals set by leadership.  Burton and Moran argue that for an 
organization to be successful in planning and managing long-term objectives there must 
be three levels of management present in the organization:  strategic, lateral, and daily.171  
Figure 19 applies their model to SWE levels of management. 
 
 
Figure 19.   SWE Management Structure.  
The surface board develops, manages, and pushes the strategy of organization to 
the lowest possible level.  CFTs work to across the surface navy in an attempt develop 
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the best solutions and implementation of decisions.  SWE support and CFT staffs work 
daily to gather data from the enterprise to ensure the right questions are being answered, 
and provide information to the surface board that requires their attention or decision. 
a. Strategic Management 
  Strategic management is defined by Burton and Moran as a permanent 
structure in an organization that is focused on the development and deployment of 
strategic goals to all levels of the daily management work units.172  In the SWE, this level 
represents the surface board and executive committee.  By comparing the role of the 
surface board presented in chapter three to the required functions of the strategic 
management level presented by Burton and Moran, it can be determined that SWE’s 
strategic management level meets these functions.  Figure 20 shows the surface board 
functions and the required functions for strategic level management as outlined by Burton 
and Moran. 
 
Figure 20.   Surface Board and Required Strategic Level Management Functions.  
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  b. Lateral Management 
  Burton and Moran define lateral management as more of a temporary, 
alliance-based structure in the organization that concentrates on organization-wide 
flexibility goals and objectives.173  This level of management is where solutions are 
developed and organizational boundaries removed.  This is partially true in the SWE. 
CFTs are a permanent part of the SWE management organization; however, there is no 
Current Readiness Team command for example.  The leaders and members of each team 
have routine duties within normally assigned commands.  Much like the surface board, 
CFTs meet on a routine basis as outlined in their annual plans.  Each team is responsible 
for their assigned areas, but SWE’s charter puts an emphasis on close collaboration 
across all CFTs.  Each CFT uses Barrier Removal Teams that are temporarily set-up, with 
a specific problem to address.  These BRTs can also have members from other CFTs as 
needed to address multi-discipline issues.  Figure 21 compares the characteristics 
important to the lateral management level according to Burton and Moran, and CFT 
responsibilities as outlined in the SWE Charter. 
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Figure 21.   CFT Responsibilities and Required Lateral Management functions. 
c. Daily Management  
  Daily management is a permanent but routine structure in an organization 
that focuses on the daily work that converts inputs into outputs.174  Since this research 
has identified that deck plate sailors and operational units are only recipients of the SWE 
decision-making process, this analysis does not consider them as part of the SWE daily 
management level.  Instead, this level is best represented by analyzing the functions of 
N40 SWE Support and CFT staffs.  N40 works directly for the SWE Commander and 
with all CFTs.  The CFT staffs give inputs to the N40 staff, which schedules the surface 
board meetings, and manages what is brought before the board.  The outputs are surface 
board decisions or AIPs. 
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4. Review Table 
Table 2 summarizes SWE’s application of enterprise organization.  
 
Analysis Topics Definition SWE Application 
Main Thing 
The single most powerful expression of 
what it hopes to accomplish, a common and 
unifying concept to which every unit can 
contribute. 
“Warships ready for tasking, at the right 
place, the right time, and right cost.” 
Vertical Element 
All employees understand organization-
wide goals and their role in achieving them.  
Strategy converted to meaningful work at 
the lowest level.  
Process in place to convert strategy to 
meaningful work at the lowest level through 
strategic initiatives and CFT annual plans.  
Current gap in enterprise understanding as 
many O-3 and below sailors are not aware of 
the SWE, and their contribution to its main 
thing.  
Horizontal Element 
Eliminates the boundaries within the 
organization. Incorporates the right people 
into the decision making process. 
Cross-Functional Teams, and Barrier 
Removal Teams.  Each CFT has a focused 
area, but cross-collaboration is a standard 
practice to ensure removal of organizational 
barriers. 
Strategic Management 
A permanent structure in an organization, 
focused on the development and deployment 
of strategic goals to all levels of the daily 
management work units. 
EXCOMM and Surface Board comprised of 
senior surface leaders and stakeholder 
commands.  Governing body of the 
organization and ensures surface warfare 
priorities are aligned throughout all levels 
and elevated to Echelon I and II leaders. 
Lateral Management 
Alliance based structure, concentrates on 
organization wide goals and objectives, 
develops solutions that break down barriers. 
Five CFTs with three supporting teams.  
Members have duties in separate commands, 
but come together routinely as designated in 
their annual plans.  Focused on collaborative 
solutions, first level of barrier identification 
and removal.  
Daily Management 
A permanent but routine structure, focuses 
on the routine daily work that converts 
inputs into outputs, continuously improves 
routine processes, comprises a majority of 
the employees, internally focused but should 
be ready to adapt as the organization 
strategic management changes direction or 
emphasis. 
Consistent collaboration among N40 SWE 
Support and CFT Staffs.  Civilian 
government employees and Co-located Booz 
Allen consultants provide strategy and 
tactical support. 





C. ANALYSIS OF SWE GOVERNANCE 
 This section will focus on the concepts of governance by analyzing how the SWE 
surface board works.  Margot Cairnes discusses the effects behavioral dynamics have on 
effective decision-making in the boardroom, in board committees and by senior 
executives.175  This discussion raises a few questions.  What defines good governance?  
How can governance be analyzed?  As the surface board serves as the SWE governing 
body, its successes and failures are directly correlated to SWE.  By utilizing the Four 
Processes of Good governance diagram, this section will analyze governance in relation 
to the SWE surface board.  Table 3 is the framework that will be used to analyze SWE’s 
governance. 
Analysis Topics Definition 
Board Processes 
Recognizes the requirement to 
implement good processes.  
However, even the best 
processes are driven by people, 
who in turn driven by personal 
and group based factors.  
Processes only work well when 
people operate them well. 
Board Malfunctions 
Notices the early warning signs 
that indicate these processes are 
malfunctioning and could cause 
problems later on 
Board Dynamics 
Understands the human 
dynamics that create these 
malfunctions and how these 
dynamics can change for better 
decisions 
Board Culture 
Ensures that the environment is 
optimal for continuing good 
governance.  This may require 
modifying processes to 
incorporate lessons learned 
during the first three processes. 
 
Table 3. Framework for Analysis of Surface Board Governance. 
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1. Board Processes 
In order for a board to be successful, processes need to be in place that allow for 
implementation of new procedures.176  SWE surface board does this by facilitating an 
open flow of communication between its members.  This open flow of communication 
and information serves as the process.  The ability for members of the board to introduce 
new ideas without the fear of reprisal is a pivotal method within the SWE.  Based on 
observations made at a surface board meeting this procedure of going around the room 
(in some cases a virtual room) and openly discussing and debating ideas until they 
become action items is the fundamental tool in the success of SWE. 
2. Board Malfunctions  
The surface board is made up of stakeholders from senior leadership positions 
throughout the navy.  Each one of these members has a vested interest in the success of 
the company.  Unlike civilian run corporations, which may have different compensation 
packages for each of the board members, the only separation in the surface board is one 
of rank.  Each member’s bona-fide interest in the success of the organization is vested in 
personal pride and patriotism.  Margot Cairnes describes several scenarios in which you 
would notice a breakdown in how a board functions.  It is difficult for people inside a 
group to recognize and to judge when and how the group is dysfunctional, because their 
behavior in the group is largely subconscious.177 SWE uses the EMM as an internal 
auditing tool to track how it is developing as an enterprise organization; however, SWE 
does not currently employ an external oversight instrument to evaluate the performance 
of the surface board.    
 3. Board Dynamics 
 The surface board is run by human beings, which means it is subject to social 
behavior that can sub-optimize its performance.  Margot Cairnes discusses how failures 
occur within organizations.  She states that “when failures occur in an organization 
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people think that one individual, or group of individuals, is incompetent or has engaged 
in malevolent behavior…”178  This is a possible scenario in any board of directors to 
include the SWE Surface Board.  The SWE Surface Board is designed to not be 
controlled by one person.  The members have a vested interest in their own commands, 
and will fight for every attribute that will increase the worth or capabilities of the area 
they are responsible for.  These are reached without the intent of ruining another 
members, career, command, or program, but for the benefit of the entire organization. 
 4. Board Culture 
 To ensure the environment is adequate for the flow of ideas, the surface board 
meets on a monthly basis and together once a year face to face.  The normal meetings 
are conducted via Virtual Telecommunication Connection (VTC).   The VTC 
technology allows for board members to appear as if they are in the same room with the 
commands that are present.  Once a member desires to speak, the technology puts him 
“virtually” in a room on a monitor.  This member is now speaking real-time face to face 
with the other SWE board-members.  This environment allows for the open flow of 
communication because all of its stakeholders are present at the same time.  Information 
is passed electronically, and decisions are made in front of everyone, with all members 
either agreeing or dissenting in full view of the entire board. 
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5. Review Table 
Table 4 summarizes SWE analysis of Surface Board governance. 
 
Analysis Topics Definition SWE Application 
Board Processes 
Recognizes the requirement to 
implement good processes.  
However, even the best 
processes are driven by people, 
who in turn driven by personal 
and group based factors.  
Processes only work well when 
people operate them well. 
SWE has an open framework 
which allows processes to be 
developed with all parties 
present can provide input and 
share ideas. 
Board Malfunctions 
Notices the early warning signs 
that indicate these processes are 
malfunctioning and could cause 
problems later on 
SWE is lead by a panel, and not 
one CEO.  Operates without 
external oversight. 
Board Social Dynamics 
Understands the human 
dynamics that create these 
malfunctions and how these 
dynamics can change for better 
decisions 
All members have a common 
goal and are vested with the best 
interests of the Surface Navy. 
Board Culture 
Ensures that the environment is 
optimal for continuing good 
governance.  This may require 
modifying processes to 
incorporate lessons learned 
during the first three processes. 
VTC technology allows for all 
SWE stakeholders to discuss 
SWE topics face-to-face 
Table 4. Summary of SWE Governance Analysis. 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF SWE LEADERSHIP  
 Leadership and how it is distributed is the glue of an organizations alignment.179  
This section will focus on analyzing SWE’s leadership with respect to how it is 
distributed throughout the organization, and how well it compares to the responsibilities 
and behavioral functions outlined by Burton and Moran. Table 5 is the framework that 
will be used to analyze SWE’s organization. 
 
                                                 




Presence of capable leadership in different 
units and at different levels of an 
organization.  
Responsibilities 
Develop and distribute strategy, explain, 
council, and coach lower level managers, 
foster enthusiasm and trust in lower levels by 
empowering people, and delivering resources 
for them to accomplish the strategic direction 
they established, ensure people understand 
what is expected. 
Behavioral Functions 
Leadership willing to practice and perform 
four critical behavioral functions:  Chosen 
thought, conscious speech, consistent action, 
and constant care. 
Table 5. Framework for Analysis of SWE Leadership. 
1. Leadership Distribution 
 Distributed leadership is defined by Labovitz and Rosansky as the presence of 
capable leadership in different units and at different levels of an organization.180  For the 
surface board and CFTs to be effective, leadership must believe in the enterprise and 
what the board is trying to accomplish.  SWE requires leadership willing to openly 
discuss their problems, and demonstrate trust and confidence in all levels of the 
organization.  This distribution is made difficult for SWE by the constant rotation and 
position changes of Flag Officers and senior commanders.  This frequent rotation poses 
two large challenges: 
 Managing surface board membership. 
 Ensuring proper CFT leadership that is enthusiastic about SWE and 
capable of providing guidance and direction for their respective teams. 
With this high level of rotation, new leadership must continually be incorporated into 
surface board meetings, which can have a profound effect on the dynamic of the entire 
organization. 
 How each CFT is composed is also an important aspect to SWE’s effectiveness as 
an organization.  Dimancescu says that CFTs should be composed of people who know 
and live with a process and have day-to-day responsibilities taken from across an 
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organizations divisions, departments, suppliers, or customers.181  SWE CFTs are set up 
with senior leaders in charge who have the right personnel and resources to run that 
specific CFT.  For example, SWE’s Strategic Financial Management Team is led by a 
senior executive service member who has the most experience and capability in dealing 
with money and resources.  Another example is the Personnel Readiness Team led by the 
Vice CNSF and PERS 41, which has all the resources and personnel to address concerns 
related to manning.  This composition and distribution of leadership is vital to SWE’s 
ability to link divisional and departmental activities through horizontal communication. 
2. Responsibilities 
 According to Burton and Moran, an organizations leadership has responsibilities 
that are largely based around the strategy of the organization.  These responsibilities are 
focused on developing the strategy, providing guidance and council on how to execute it, 
delivering resources to accomplish it, and being accountable for the outcome.  
 SWE leadership has developed an appropriate strategic plan that is detailed, and 
easily understood.  With recurring meetings of surface board members, the SWE 
commander, deputy commander, and CFT leaders are able to coach lower level personnel 
in their planned direction, and ensure people understand what is expected.  In this forum, 
SWE leadership is also able to influence the allocation of resources in an attempt to 
provide surface leaders and managers the resources needed to accomplish the strategic 
direction.   
 Additionally, Burton and Moran argue that leadership also has the responsibility 
to develop trust in all levels of the organization by empowering people in the execution 
of strategy.  This research has identified a gap in SWE knowledge at the deckplate level 
of the surface navy.  SWE leadership has also identified this and has developed a 
strategic communications plan for the 2009 through 2011 time period to address it.  The 
purpose of this plan is to bring the SWE message to the right audience.  Through the 
Strategic Communications Team, SWE leadership is attempting to push strategy, 
enthusiasm, and knowledge to both internal and external stakeholders.  According to 
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Burton and Moran, if personnel understand their contribution to the strategy set by 
leadership, and receive the resources necessary to achieve it, they will be empowered to 
accomplish it.  
3. Behavior 
 SWE is still developing as an enterprise organization.  As the organization 
continues to incorporate a holistic type of management, Burton and Moran assert that 
leadership must perform four critical behavior functions.   These functions were 
determined so leadership could better understand the impact their behavior has on the 
organization as it attempts to transform its style of organization and management.   
  a. Chosen Thought 
  This involves leadership evaluation of the organization as a system.  The 
focus should be on the sharing of information, review of data, and improvement of 
processes.  SWE leadership puts a lot of emphasis on measuring and analyzing the 
system through metrics; some examples of these metrics were given in the previous 
chapter.  These metrics are shared throughout the organization, and gives leadership the 
ability to address different parameters of a problem situation, instead of defaulting to 
people as the problem.  Where this becomes difficult is transferring the information SWE 
leaders get out of these performance metrics, to funding and policy decision makers that 
are not part of the organization. 
  b. Conscious Speech 
  What leadership says affects the tone for cultural change in the 
organization.  Leadership must focus on improvements, encourage questions, discuss 
critical processes, and focus on breakthroughs.  This is evident in current SWE 
leadership.  The culture that SWE leadership has established during surface board 
meetings facilitates an open and honest discussion between leaders at different levels of 
the organization.  The current SWE commander emphasizes the importance of the 
discussion, rather than the quality of the presentation.   
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  c. Consistent Action 
  Leadership must apply consistent behavior throughout the organization.  
This is more of a challenge for SWE leadership given the complexity of the system, and 
the number of stakeholders in the organization.  Consistency is also difficult with 
continuous rotation of leadership.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the tone of SWE 
changed dramatically with a new SWE commander and strategic consultants in March of 
2008.  The current leadership has developed a strategic plan and charter that provides 
guidance and structure to the organization.  This will provide some consistency during 
leadership transitions, however, the direction of SWE will be largely determined by how 
its future leadership views, and applies enterprise practices. 
  d. Constant Care 
  Leadership must continuously ensure people that they are on the right 
course.  They do so by providing resources, training, rewards, and recognition for 
appropriate behavior and accomplishments.  SWE leadership has an internal rewards and 
recognition program that allows leadership to recognize outstanding performance and 
contribution to the SWE effort.  Another program that rewards the appropriate behavior is 
NAVSEA’s Incentivized Energy Conservation initiative (i-ENCON).  This program 
rewards underway ships who use less fuel than the class average for that particular ship.  
A cash incentive is given to leading fuel conservers that can be used to improve a ships 
readiness level by sending sailors offsite to continue professional education and 
qualifications.  These are examples of programs that involve SWE and can re-enforce the 
behavior SWE is trying to implement on a larger scale. 
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4. Review Table 
 Table 6 summarizes SWE’s application of enterprise leadership.  
Leadership Definition SWE Application 
Distribution 
Presence of capable leadership in 
different units and at different levels 
of an organization.  
SWE leadership must believe in the enterprise 
approach.  Constant rotation of Flag Officers poses 
challenges to surface membership, and maintaining 
CFT effectiveness.  CFT leaders have the right 
personnel and resources to run their CFTs.  The 
right distribution of leadership is vital to SWEs 
horizontal communication ability. 
Responsibilities 
Develop and distribute strategy, 
explain, council, and coach lower 
level managers, foster enthusiasm and 
trust in lower levels by empowering 
people, and delivering resources for 
them to accomplish the strategic 
direction they established, ensure 
people understand what is expected. 
SWE leadership has developed an enterprise 
strategy and is distributing it to all surface navy 
levels via their strategic communications plan.  A 
constant meeting of surface board members also 
allows leadership to ensure people understand what 
is expected.  Leadership prioritizes requirements 
and attempts to maximize the influence in the 
resource allocation process. 
Behavioral Functions 
Leadership willing to practice and 
perform four critical behavioral 
functions:  Chosen thought, conscious 
speech, consistent action, and constant 
care. 
SWE leadership is showing aspects of all four 
functions.  Consistent action is difficult to achieve 
due to the complexity of the SWE system, and 
rotation of leadership.  Governing documents and 
practices provide some consistency, but the 
direction of SWE is still determined by leadership 
views. 
Table 6. Summary of SWE Leadership Analysis. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
 This chapter provided an analysis of SWE’s implementation of enterprise 
management through the framework of organization, governance, and leadership.  It used 
the models and concepts presented in the literature review as a tool for evaluation. 
 The analysis of SWE’s organization identified how different elements are linked 
to SWE’s main thing, warships ready for tasking.  It is uses horizontal organization to 
maximize cross-collaboration and remove organizational barriers.  Although SWE is a 
horizontal structure, there is still a vertical element that allows strategy to be pushed to 
the lowest level of the organization.  It is also recognized that sailors on the waterfront 
are recipients of the SWE decision making process, and act indirectly in implementing 
the priorities established by SWE.  This analysis also identified the three levels of SWE’s 
management structure as the surface board, cross-functional teams, and SWE support. 
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 The analysis of SWE’s governance analyzed four characteristics that describe its 
governing body, the surface board.  It determined that the open flow of communication 
and discussion is the main process of the surface board.  It identified a shortfall in 
external oversight that is commonly used to oversee boards of directors in corporate 
structures.  It looked at how personal behaviors and agendas can influence the 
effectiveness of decisions made by the board.  This analysis identified the culture of the 
surface board and determined that recurring face to face to interaction has fostered an 
environment of shared beliefs and understandings. 
 The analysis of SWE’s leadership is characterized by the distribution, 
responsibilities, and behavioral functions.  For the organization to be effective, leadership 
must believe in enterprise principles, and be distributed throughout the CFTs despite the 
constant turnover of personnel.  SWE leadership is fulfilling its responsibilities in 
executing strategy by ensuring constant communication with its members through 
monthly meetings.  Leadership is demonstrating the correct behavioral functions 
necessary to evolve as an organization.  SWE has established governing documents and 
standard practices in an attempt to provide consistent behavior across the organization 
however, the future direction of SWE will be determined by its leadership. 
 This analysis forms the basis for conclusions, recommendations, and further areas 
of research.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This project provides an external look at the Surface Warfare Enterprise and how 
it has implemented enterprise management practices through organization, governance, 
and leadership.  It also attempted to identify if any changes in resource allocation can be 
attributed to the enterprise practices of the SWE.  The project first presented a 
background of how process improvement initiatives led to the development of the navy 
enterprise management system, and how the SWE fit into that framework.  It then 
reviewed literature related to concepts of enterprise management, presented the SWE 
through review of archival documents and data gathered from interviews with key SWE 
personnel, and analyzed the relationship of those findings to the framework of concepts 
discussed in corporate literature.   
The project was able to identify how enterprise management was first 
implemented, and through research of SWE history, was able to determine how it has 
developed.  It details how SWE is organized, governed, and led.  It was able to identify 
some attributed effect on resource allocation; however, it was unable to sufficiently 
answer the supporting research questions.  The data gathered focused primarily on 
establishing a firm understanding of the various relationships and processes of the SWE 
organization.  Once data for the primary research question was analyzed, it was realized 
that the supporting questions were not appropriately asked or adequately addressed 
during the research process.  The correct approach to determine SWE’s effect on 
resources has been identified and will be recommended for further research.  
 The project will conclude with recommendations to maximize SWE’s influence, 
and suggestions for further research.  It is intended that this project will provide a greater 
awareness of the SWE mission, and assist leadership in the further development of the 






 The conclusions of this project are presented in the context of the research 
questions asked in Chapter I. 
 1. Primary Research Question: 
 How was enterprise management implemented in Surface Warfare Enterprise; 
how is it organized, governed and led? 
 SWE has applied enterprise management practices through organization, 
governance, and leadership.  Most of these applications correspond to the models and 
concepts presented in the literature.  These models have also identified areas of 
inconsistency and potential challenges unique to SWE that must be managed carefully.   
a. Organization 
The horizontal application of cross-functional management has been very 
effective in increasing cross-collaboration of important stakeholders and decision-
makers.  Cross-functional teams have the right composition of experience and resources 
to produce the appropriate outputs.  This cross-functional effectiveness is also consistent 
with the management structure model.  From a strategic level of management, SWE has 
been able to produce an effective strategic plan that is being pushed to lower levels of the 
enterprise.  The lateral level of management (CFTs) has been able to take that strategy 
and formulate annual plans that will deliver outputs in support of the organizations 
strategic direction.  However, when applying this model, the area of inconsistency with 
how SWE is organized is seen at the daily management level.  SWE’s structure suggests 
the lowest level of the SWE is the N40 support staff, and staffs of the CFTs.  How 
deckplate sailors fit in the organization is largely unclear.  The analysis identifies that 
they are recipients of the SWE decision-making process, but if the organizations 
measurement of success is a warship ready for tasking, the sailors who provide the daily 
work output to get a warship ready for that tasking need to be aligned with SWE goals. 
This is also consistent when applying the main thing model to SWE’s linking of the 
people element.   The current gap in knowledge and understanding of SWE strategy, 
mission, and in some cases, its very existence within lower levels of the surface navy, 
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suggests the organization has not yet been able to fully align all levels of the surface navy 
in pursuit of one common goal.  The models suggest that there must be an understanding 
of strategy and goals at the lowest level of any organization.  If sailors are part of the 
output, then they are a direct part of the organization and must know how the quality of 
their output is contributing to the larger organization.  
b. Governance 
How the surface board is structured does not necessarily determine how 
effective it will be.  The determining factor that drives the performance of the board is the 
behavior and social dynamic between its members.  The surface board has been the 
SWE’s largest success.  Since 2005, it has grown in membership along with the addition 
of CFTs.  The behavior and processes of the surface board is consistent with practices 
suggested in the literature review.  The consistency of board meetings, and the culture of 
open and honest communication among all stakeholders, no matter the rank, has been the 
key to SWE’s ability in developing a holistic style of management.  An area of concern is 
the latitude given for membership and the constant rotations of surface board leaders.  
High levels of rotation are a product of navy culture and are often a beneficial as new sets 
of eyes come into an organization.  However, corporate practices would argue that 
organization governance must be stable.  This is a challenge that SWE must recognize 
and continually address.  Another area of SWE governance that is not consistent with 
corporate governance practices is the necessary process of external performance 
evaluations.  SWE does not have an impartial process to determine how well the surface 
board is performing, and if certain social dynamics are sub-optimizing its potential 
outputs.   
c. Leadership 
 SWE’s understanding of the leadership responsibilities, and behaviors 
required to develop the enterprise organization is consistent with recommendations from 
literature.  The current leadership in the SWE executive committee and surface board 
believes in the enterprise management approach, and what the organization is trying to 
achieve.  This distribution of leadership is important to the collaboration between all the 
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major stakeholders.  SWE recognizes the need for leaders who are willing to be 
collaborative in their leadership approach.  The challenge faced by SWE is the added 
complexity of constant leadership rotations, which are not necessarily common to 
corporate enterprises.  These rotations can affect the consistency of action across the 
leadership of the SWE.  To ensure the right distribution, SWE is faced with the challenge 
of managing surface board membership, and ensuring the right type of leaders are present 
in the CFTs.   
2. Supporting Research Questions 
 To what extent have there been changes in resource allocation? 
 
 Can these changes in resource allocation be attributed to SWE? 
 
  This is best answered by addressing both questions together.  This project 
identified some changes in the way resources have been allocated, specifically money 
and manning. A specific example was given on how SWE leadership identified the 
negative effect of optimal manning initiatives and has re-allocated the billets that were 
taken away in order to reverse the negative effect of these optimal manning initiatives.  It 
also identified how commands with certain funding control have been brought into the 
influence of the enterprise.  Determining the resource effects beyond these examples was 
difficult, and the research approach did not support gathering the right data to sufficiently 
answer and analyze the supporting questions.  SWE is not an entity that has clear control 
of identifiable resources.  Instead it seeks to influence the budgeting of resources at 
higher levels.  However, determining the precise effect of this influence is complicated to 
measure.  Once the SWE Executive Director receives inputs, and establishes what the 
priorities are going to be for that specific budget cycle, it is sent further up the process 
where competition across the larger enterprise determines how it is allocated.  The 
information and priorities generated by the SWE may not be the factors taken into 
account by the policy makers.  Although very useful to the surface navy, the priorities 
established by SWE may not have a consistent measure of effect in a system where 
decisions are often based on politics.    
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 Since this the project lacked sufficient data to identify specific changes in 
systematic resource allocation that can be attributed to SWE, it was not able to present an 
adequate analysis. This is largely due to asking the wrong supporting questions. A more 
appropriate research question, which is recommended for further research, is how are the 
priorities of the SWE influencing the systematic budgeting process of resource allocation 
and what specific changes in resource allocations can be attributed to SWE.  A 
comparison of the priorities that are established by SWE, and what is actually put in the 
navy’s POM and budgeted for is needed.  This approach would better determine the 
effect of SWE’s strategy of influence on the systematic process of resource allocation at 
the budget level.  This research approach must involve the leadership of SWE’s Strategic 
Financial Management Team as the main source of data. Research on this matter must 
also take place outside of CNSF.  N8 and N86 must also be a source of data in order to 
have a comparison between SWE, and the larger budgeting system.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The following recommendations were reached based on observations made while 
conducting research for this project.  They were made after a detailed review of SWE 
documents and interviews of key SWE.  A literature review examined enterprise 
management materials and was a key tool to the analysis conducted.  The 
recommendations reached reflect the author’s opinions only and not the opinions of the 
United States Navy. 
1. Allow Unit Level Leadership More Exposure to the Surface Board 
 Providing division officers attending SWOS, department heads attending DH 
school, and PCOs and PXOs the ability to view the surface board in action through VTC 
would give greater knowledge and exposure of SWE’s mission to lower levels of the 
surface navy.  This would allow unit leaders to see how management of resources at the 
lowest levels impacts the larger strategy of the surface force.  It will also put trust in the 
organization by permitting more transparency of the enterprise decision making process.  
This recommendation was reached by observations made while attending a surface board 
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meeting.  Our analysis presented the value of these meetings, and a logical conclusion is 
to allow more exposure to junior officers while attending SWOS. 
2. Discontinue Use of the Enterprise Maturity Model as the 
Organizations Self-Audit Tool  
 The EMM was a tool used by Thomas Group to help the development of the SWE 
organization when it was first beginning as an organization.  Since then, the culture of 
SWE has changed.  The matrix is very extensive and complex.  The matrix should be 
scaled down to include a realistic number of carefully chosen measurements that does not 
involve such a large analysis effort.  Another option would be to incorporate the 
enterprise improvement plans into the annual plan deliverables of the organization.  This 
would provide more frequent updates on the state of enterprise improvements or barriers 
to development.  This recommendation is derived from a careful examination of the 
EMM.   
3. Establish a Governing Board Performance Observation Process 
Across all Warfare Enterprises  
 The success of the SWE is closely attributed to the performance of the surface 
board.  Can this board function more efficiently?  Have other enterprises developed more 
effective and cost efficient processes? A panel should be created that looks at each 
warfare enterprise governing body for possible lessons learned that could be used in other 
warfare areas.  This would provide greater collaboration of enterprise practices through 
the navy enterprise.  Panels would be made up of administrative support staff from each 
enterprise.  Since these members are not stakeholders in any enterprise, they can remain 
impartial to new ideas.  This panel would observe and report any findings to each 
enterprise commander.   This recommendation is based on best practices in enterprise 
management as seen by the authors.  A panel of impartial officers may discover new 
ideas that would add to the overall success of the organization. 
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D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 This report has established the groundwork from which further research on SWE 
can be conducted.  Determining SWE’s ability or inability to affect the allocation of 
resources at the budget level will clarify the influence that SWE priorities actually have 
on the larger budgeting process.  How this research should be conducted was provided in 
section B of this chapter.   
Ultimately, the success of SWE is measured by increased readiness through the 
surface fleet.  Further research should compare fleet readiness data such as TFOM, 
MFOM or other PESTO scores with O&M funding data.  If O&M spent per ship 
decreases and readiness levels increase, then that would demonstrate a positive 
measurable impact of SWE.  This would also determine if enterprise behavior at a 
strategic level was able to change behavior at the unit level. 
The link between SWE and the fleet is important to address further as well.  This 
project identified the knowledge gap present at the deckplate level.  The current SWE 
strategic communications plan is attempting to expand knowledge of the SWE 
throughout the surface navy.  Research can be conducted that evaluates whether or not 
the communications plan was successful in reaching the deckplate level.  Interviewing 
and surveying junior personnel, mainly division officers and chiefs serving afloat, would 
be the best research approach for this question. 
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APPENDIX B 




Enterprise Leadership Team prioritization of 
tasks and change management has begun.  
There is some collaboration between 
stakeholders.
Major core business processes have an Enterprise 
senior level process owner
Multi-functional Enterprise Leadership 
Team driving CFTs is the organizational 
construct that manages the Enterprise 
Leadership process
Organization roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities are defined across 
Enterprise stakeholders in a manner that 
optimizes CWR
A properly constructed BOD and all 
subordinate units independently seek to 
optimize Enterprise performance
Governance Management processes are clearly identified and have begun improvement throughout the 
Enterprise
Enterprise Leadership drives a "change friendly" 
culture and applies a rich set of change management 
skills
Domain governance is compliant and 
consistent with the higher Enterprise stds. 
with utilization of lessons learned
The Enterprise Leadership Team drives 
execution of an integrated strategy and 
planning processes 
Common metrics package drives Enterprise 
behaviors and actions on a drumbeat basis
Alignment Enterprise Vision statements, goals, and objectives exist, are communicated 
throughout and have begun to govern entity 
prioritizations and actions
The common metrics package is transparent with 
goals and objectives clearly defined.  There is a clear 
understanding of driver and result metrics.
All business and support process inputs 
and outputs are aligned throughout the 
Enterprise and all Domains 
There is broad accountability with time-
phased goals and a process to harvest and 
bank Enterprise results
Enterprise quickly executes defined 
processes that address dilemmas of 
funding and recapitalization pressure
Management 
Process Scope & 
Boundaries
Management has created a clear set of 
business rules for managing the Enterprise 
and identifies the areas out of management 
scope (e.g. Congressional Funding)
All direct reporting organizations and their portions of 
processes are subject to Enterprise management
Enterprise manages all aspects of key 
leveraged value stream processes, and 
strongly, collaboratively influences those 
subprocesses not in their direct chain of 
command
Enterprise strongly, collaboratively 
influences all key, leveraged enabling and 
supporting processes, including those 
subprocesses not in their direct chain of 
command
Enterprise formally defines and manages 
the funding, savings harvest, and savings 
banking processes
Problem / Barrier 
Resolution
Business Process and Culture Barriers are 
identified and prioritized relative to impact on 
the Enterprise goals and objectives
Senior Flag Officers accept responsibility for and act 
on removing Business Process and Cultural Barriers
Comprehensive plan is developed for 
removal of Culture Barriers and agreed to 
by all Stakeholders
Some Culture Barriers are removed and 
change is visible throughout the Enterprise
Barrier removal is the improvement culture 
of the Enterprise
Strategy & Planning Both current realities and a clear vision of the future exist and govern the strategic planning 
process
Strategic planning process identifies and clearly 
articulates Enterprise critical conflicting issues and the 
initial steps required to resolve
Strategic process generates a strategic 
and tactical plan that resolves the 
Enterprise critical issues and meets 
customer needs
Integrated strategic Financial Model is 
Enterprise-focused and includes all domains 
and all sources and applications of funds 
and all improvement initiatives
Enterprise strategic process cascades to all 
subordinate domains & supporting entities, 
and directs decision making models for 
investment and resource allocation
Execution & Results
Process Driven All leveraged value stream and enabling business processes are mapped, character-
ized and transparent.  The critical inputs for 
successful process outputs are identified.
Key business processes are identified and force-
ranked by objectively defined leveraged improvement 
opportunity (relative to achieving goals and objectives 
/ CWR)
Processes & their outputs are the primary 
means to measure & communicate Enter-
prise activity, status, progress & barriers, 
and to identify and drive required changes
All leveraged business process intersections 
have well-defined inputs, outputs and the 
required timing, cost and quality
All processes across the Extended 
Enterprise, and their intersections, operated 
effectively and are customer driven
Metrics - drivers and 
results
Hierarchical, business process metrics are 
used, on a drumbeat basis, as the foundation 
for identifying barriers and driving org. 
behaviors & priorities.  Metrics include both 
leading indicators (drivers) and results.
A robust structure exists for metric data collection, 
metric calculation, prioritization, and accurate and 
timely metric reporting for all Domains and for the 
Enterprise
Hierarchical metrics are insightful and 
directive and drive productivity 
improvements
There is a single Enterprise driven set of 
metrics used by the Enterprise and all 
subordinate units
All Enterprise units have achieved full 
Metrics Infrastructure maturity.  All Enter-
prise levels are managed with hierarchical, 
transparent, common and linked metrics.  
Adaptive planning capability exists.
Cost Management Enterprise is financially defined, costs collected and analyzed and Financial Cost 
Planning Processes are defined and initiated.
Financial Planning Process is used to start driving 
productivity improvements and a routine reporting 
process has been initiated
A CFO organization exists.  Each 
Business Process owner is knowledgeable 
of and held accountable for planning and 
improving productivity.  Productivity can be 
measured at the level needed by the org.
Subordinate level Financial Models exists 
and are utilized at those levels.  Cost 
reporting systems are hierarchical and 
timely.  Both these processes continue to 
drive Enterprise productivity improvements.
CFO organization is integrated with the 
operators who effectively utilize the 
financial processes to make the strategic 
and structural decisions necessary to 
recapitalize the Navy.     
Improvement 
Process
A barrier escalation process exists and is 
active throughout the Enterprise
Fully empowered Cross Functional Teams and Barrier 
Removal Teams are actively managing process 
improvement 
A formal Lessons Learned process is in 
place and used to sustain and transfer 
improvement efforts across the Enterprise
The Enterprise Leadership Team sets Enter-
prise Leadership goals and priorities to 
optimize results across all Domains  
processes.  Cross-Process & -Domain 
Impact charts exist to guide goals & 
priorities
Enterprise strategy and a "Continuous 
Architecture" govern the improvement 
process goals and resources
Tools & Methodology The Enterprise uses a common set of tools and methodology for managing its business 
improvement activity.  A formal 
communications process exists.
Training process exists to provide new Enterprise 
people the tools and education needed to be a 
contributing member of the Enterprise
Monthly Enterprise Leadership Team 
updates clearly evidence the adoption and 
use of the methodology and tools
Lessons Learned concerning the 
management tools and methodology are 
shared across the Enterprise as a normal 
business practice
A cadre of "Internal Resultants" are actively 
leading process improvement throughout 
the Enterprise
Results Evidenced Synergy is evident throughout the Enterprise and all Domains as Cross Functional Teams 
are achieving visible, positive results in 
process improvement
Warfighters and Fleet collaboratively drive behavioral 
changes in other Domain's cost, priorities, and funds 
allocations
There is a demonstrated ability to rapidly 
and cost-effectively respond to changes in 
mission directed by the Navy or FFC 
Enterprises
The Enterprise and all Domains forecast and 
regularly achieve productivity improvements    
The Enterprise has achieved Cost-Wise 
Readiness goals and has generated the 
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